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PREFACE
This is the sixth semiannual report of the U.S. Department of
Labor, Office of Inspector General (OIG), submitted pursuant to
the requirements of the Inspector General Act of 1978. The report
covers the period from April i, 1981 through September 30, 1981.
During thls reporting period, we closed 339 investigations, and
issued 255 audit and loss prevention reports. Our audit work
during the period resulted in $78 million in Questioned costs and
costs recommended for disallowance. Our investioative work durino
the period, includlng program fraud, employee integrity, and
organized crime and labor racketeerino investigations, resulted in
114 indictments and 55 convictions.
Audit Resolution
Perhaps the most signiflcBnt sin_le accomplishment durina this
period has been the resolution of $301 million in audit findinos,
resultin_ in the disallowance of $103.8 million. This backlog of
unresolved audits had accumulated over e period of years. The
failure in the past to resolve these audits in a timely fashion
had been a source of great concern to the Office of Inspector
General. The personal attention and leadership given to this
issue by Assistant Secretary Angrisani was a critlcal factor in
the resolution of these audits. Policies are now _n place to
ensure prompt resolution of all future audit findinos.
(i)
Inspector General Priorities
Historical]y, the Office of Inspector General has devoted the
great majority of its audit and investigative efforts to
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs. During
this reportino period, we have given greater emphasis to other
areas of vulnerab_l_ty to fraud and waste _n the Department's
proorams--most notably the Federal Employees Compensation Act
(FECA) and Black Lung programs of the Office of Worker's
Compensation Proorams (OWCP), Emp]oyment Standards Administration
(ESA). Those initiatives, and the problems we found, are
descrlbed in the ESA sect]on of the flrst part of the report. We
have made recommendations for administrative and legislative
action to he]p reduce fraud and waste _n these programs. I have
been very encouraged by the attention and effort o_ven by Deputy
Under Secretary Co]lyer to these anti-fraud and waste efforts _n
the worker's compensation programs.
We will continue, as our resources permit, to further expand our
activities to other major areas, such as unemp]oyment _nsurance
and the regulatory programs of the Department, inc]udino the Mine
Safety and Hea]th Administration, Labor-_anaoement Services
Administration, OccupatJ.ona] Safety and Health Administration and
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.
(i_)
Inspector General Resources
The Office of Inspector Genera] has a tota] of 432 staff members.
Of these, 8v are assigned to the anti-organized crime and labor
racketeering program, working with the Organized Crime Strike
Forces of the Department of Justice. This leaves our effective
strength to carry out the anti-fraud and waste responslbilities of
the Inspector Genera] Act at 345 persons. Of this number, 157 are
auditors, 88 are investigators, and 32 are program analysts. In
addition, for Fiscal Year 1981, we had $13.8 million for contract
audits. These funds have been used almost exclusively for CETA
audits. As we attempt to provide greater coverage of the many
non-CETA proorams of the Department, we are severely limited by
our resource levels. Secretary Donovan and Under Secretary Love1]
have been very attentive to this resource problem. It is
important that the concerned committees of Congress are aware that
the present resources are not sufficient to provide the level of
coverage, which, in my view, is necessary to do a proper _ob of
preventing and detecting fraud and waste in the Department's
programs and operations.
Mandated Responsibilities
During the last two years, an increasing number of mandated
responsibilities have been placed upon the Office of Inspector
General by Congressional action and OMB directives. For example,
we are reouJred to conduct an annual audit of end-of-year
spending; to review the Department's annual procurement plans; to
(iii)
review the Department's compliance with the Federal Procurement
Data System; to review sole source contracting practices; to carry
out cognizant agency responsibilities under the "sinole audit"
reouirements of OMB Circular A-102, Attachment P; to audit the
trust fund of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation
program; to report on debts and debt collection; and to meet many
other reauirements. While each of these covers an important area,
the unintended result has been to affect greatly Inspector General
resources. This necessarily affects the time and depth of
attention we can oive to fraud and waste issues in departmental
administration, and in such programs as £ETA, unemployment
insurance, worker's compensation and other very large dollar
activities of the Department. Congressional review of the
collective impact of these mandated reouirements on the Offices of
Inspector General would be desirable.
Line Item Budoet
A comolicatino factor in addressino the true resource levels and
reouirements of the Office of Inspector General has been the
absence of a separate line item budoet for this Office.
Presently, our budget is a part of the Departmental Management
account. I recommend that the budget for the Office of Inspector
General be reported as a separate line item so that the
Department, OMB and the Congress are better informed about and
better able to address the resource needs of the Office of
Inspector General.
(iv)
Law Enforcement Authorities
A total of 168 special agents assioned to the Office of Inspector
General routinely conducts criminal investioations involving major
organized crime and labor racketeerino matters, complex white
collar crime fraud cases and serious employee integrity cases.
These agents, while "criminal invest_oators" and so classified
under the civil service system, are not authorized to exercise
basic ]aw enforcement respons_bi]_t_es (_.e., to execute search
and arrest warrants, to make arrests, to pay informants) and do
not have the concomitant authority to cmrrv firearms. This causes
problems, such as loss of evidence due to our inability to make
arrests or effect seizures; inability, in some situations, to work
undercover or to protect adeouateiy informants operatino
undercover; d_ff_cuIty in achievino the fullest level of
cooperation from other federa], state, and local aoencies; and
finally -- and of most concern to me -- the inah_lity of special
agents to protect themselves when conducting potentially dangerous
investigations. I recommend that special attention be oiven to
the need of Office of Inspector General special aoents for such
law enforcement authorities.
I have been Inspector Genera] _t the Dep_rtment of L_hor since
July 18, 198]. It has been a busy time. Managino the onooing
audit and investioative work, address_no int_rn_] manaoement
(v)
issues and morale, and, most importantly, expanding our work to
provide better prevention and detection of fraud and waste, have
been chal]enoino tasks. I would like to note that Secretary
Donovan and Under Secretary Lovel] have been extraordinarily
attentive and supportive of the work of the Office of Inspector
General and of me personally. With their support and the support
of the other officials of the Department, I am convinced that
there will be continual improvement in reducing the level of fraud
and waste and improvino the level of economy and efficiency in the
programs of the Department of Labor.
I wish to especially thank the employees of the OIG -- the
auditors, _nvestigators, analysts, technical specialists and
support staff -- who brine such dedication and ski]l to their
work. Without them, the accomplishments reported in this document
could not have been achieved.
Thomas F. McBride
Inspector General
(vi)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This semiannual report is organized into four parts and the
appendices. Part I is divided Jnto Department of Labor program
areas and describes significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies
and recommendations for corrective action. Part II is organized
by OIG office and provides information about audit and
investigative activities and major accomplishments. Part Ill
contains information ahout Jnouiries and complaints received by
the OIO Comp]aint Center. Part IV provides information about
money owed to the Department of Labor. The appendices contain
audit resolution data and a list of eli audit reports issued
durinq the reporting period.
Followino is a summary of the hioh]_ohts of this report.
Sionificant Problems, Abuses or DefJc_encies and Recommendations
for Corrective Action
- Deficiencies in FECA Claims Manaoement
A major review of 1,810 FECA claimants in the Atlanta Reoion
identified inadeouate efforts by OWCP to detect unreported _ncome
and insufficient efforts by employing agencies to meet FECA
reouirements. Thus far, our work has resu]ted _n DOL term_natino
or suspendino benefits to 62 claimants, which wi]] yield annual
savings of $572,000. Other cases are stil] under review. In
J
addition, 119 criminal investigations were initiated; and the
project has recently been expanded to a nationwide effort.
- FECA Medical Provider Fraud
OIG investigations have disclosed that false FECA c]m_ms have been
fraudulently submitted by med_ca] providers and that FECA has not
used debarment as an effective means of reducing this practice.
The OIO has recommended that the penalty for fJ]ina false claims
be increased from a misdemeanor to a felony and has proposed
deharment authority for FECA.
- Black Lung Program System Deficiencies and Overpayments Problem
As a result of two major loss prevention studies, the OIG found an
estimated $36 m_l]Jon in Black Lung unrecovered overpayments and
$4a million in improper payments from 1973 to 1980. Serious
computer and internal control weaknesses were identified, and we
concluded that insufficient priority was given by the program to
loss prevention and control. Recent efforts by ESA management to
address Black Lung program deficiencies are discussed.
- Audit Resolution
One of the most significant accomplishments has been the virtual
elimination of the Department's backlog of unresolved audit
findings. At the beginning of th_s reporting period, 79a audit
ii
reports remained unresolved with outstanding mudit findings of
$303 million. Through an intensive Departmental effort $301
million, inc]udino $_ million of costs Questioned durina the
current reportina period, has now been resolved, resulting in
$103.8 m_llion enterino the debt collection process. Further, a
number of policies and procedures have been established to help
ensure that audit resolution problems do not recur.
- InadeQuate Financial _anagement and Internal Controls at CETA
State and Local Prime Sponsors and Their Suborantees
Durino this six-month period, amounts Questioned in audit reports
resultino from these deficiencies total $35 million. A recent
audit of CETA's cash manaoement system confirmed that CETA
recipients have failed to provide effective control over grantee
cash balances and included a number of recommended corrective
actions.
- ContinuJ. na Problem of Inelioible Participants in CETA
Audlts and investigations continue to show inelioibility as a
major problem in CETA. During this reporting period, over $20
million was Questioned due to possible ineligible participants.
An OIG study of CETA's eliaibility determination and verification
system, which recommended various corrective actions, was
completed.
- OIG Activities Related to ONP Contractina
The OIG is focusino audit and _nvestigat_ve attention on
procurement practices in ETA's Office of National Proorams.
iii
Actions by ETA to prevent contractino problems, particularly in
the area of sole source procurement, are also discussed.
- Weaknesses in the Approval and Certification of Wine Safety
Products
A recent audit of MSHA's Approval and Certification Center, which
is responsible for mine safety eouipment approval and ouality
assurance, found a ]aroe hackloo of unprocessed product approval
appl_cations, poor operatino procedures, and an ineffective
ouality control prooram. We made various recommendations to
alleviate these problems, including the use of third-party
independent laboratories to evaluate and test less-hazardous
mining products.
OIG Activity Data
- Office of Investigations
There were 50 indictments and 30 convictions hased on our
investigations. Fines, recoveries, savings, and collections
resultino from _nvestioations totaled about $_ million.
- Office of Audit
We issued 250 audit reports on DOL proorams. Of the $4.5 hJllJon
audited, we took exception to $78 million due primarily to
improper financia] manaoement practices and ine]ioible
participants.
iv
- Office of Loss Analysis and Prevention
Four final loss prevention reports were issued. They concerned
Black Lung prooram vulnerability and loss assessment, FECA benefit
programs, and CETA's elioibi]ity determination and verification
system.
Office of Oroanized Crime and Labor Racketeerino
Based on our investigations, 64 persons were indicted durino the
last six months and 25 convictions were obtained.
Among the more s_gnificant are:
- The indictment of three officers of the United Seafood
Workers Local 359 and five employers for extortion and
prohibited employer payments aris_nn out of labor
racketeering activities in the Fulton Fish _arket in New
York City;
- the prosecution in Delaware of six persons in a nationwide
]ahor-]easino scheme that Circumvented Teamster union
contract reou_rements, with the principal defendant
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment;
- the recent indictment of an international v_ce president
and the president of a local union of the Distillery, Wine
and Allied Workers International Union on charges of
i embezzling $]O0,O00j
d
V
- two recent related indictments of 21 defendants including
Anthony Accardo, Santo Trafflcante, Raymond Patrlarca and
the president and secretary-treasurer of the Laborers
Internatlona] Union on charges of racketeerlno vlolatlons
involvlng a pattern of insurance kickback schemes totallng
over $) mi111on.
vl
PART I
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS, ABUSES OR DEFICIENCIES
AND RECOMMENDATIONSFOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
The Employment Standards Administration (ESA) through its three
component offices -- the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
(OWCP), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
and the W8ge and Hour Division -- provides workers' compensation
to those injured on their iobs, reouires federal contractors and
subcontractors to provide eoual employment opportunity, and
administers laws and regulations settino employment standards.
During Fiscal Year 1981, ESA was budgeted for $1.23 billion. The
largest portion of the ESA budget is expended for the payment of
benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) and
the Black Lung Programs, both under the Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs.
Office of Workers' Compensation Proprams (OWCP)
OWCP encompasses al] three workers' compensation programs--the
Division of Federal Employees Compensation (FECA), the Division of
Coal Mine Workers' Compensation (Black Lung), and the Divison of
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation (Longshore). During
Fiscal Year 1980, over $784 million was paid in benefits under
FECA and $660.5 million under Black Lung. Under the Longshore
program, $294 million was paid _n benefits during calendar year
]980, virtually all of which was paid by private insurance
carriers and self-insured companies. Recent OIG work related to
ESA programs has been concentrated almost exclusively on FECA and
Black Lung.
Federal Emp]oyees Compensation Act (FECA) Program
The FECA Program pays benefits to federal employees and other
covered workers who incur disabl]ity or disease through on-the-job
injury or exposure. Durlng Fiscal Year 1980, over $784 million in
compensation and medical payments were made to over 288,000
long-term and temporary disability claimants. For Fiscal Year
1981, payments are expected to reach $856 million for
approximately 281,000 claimants. FECA has grown from a payment
level of $190 million in Fiscal Year 1972 to $984 million
projected for Fiscal Year 1982.
The major problems identified in the FECA program are defJIc_encies
in claims management, inadeouate attention to safeguards in bill
p_yment operations, and vulnerability to medical provider fraud.
- C]aims Management Deficiencies
Deficiencies _n the management of claims by claims examiners is a
s_gnificant prob]em in FECA and has received OIG investigative
attention during this reporting period, A project initiated by
OIO in the Atlanta Region, in response to numerous allegations of
- 2 -
fraud, waste, and abuse in the program, identified unreported
income end Jnadeouate ongoing case file review as significant
problems.
The project's objectives were to identify the fo]lowin#:
- FECA long-term disability cases that should be reviewed
f_r possible reduction or termination of benefits as a
result of unreported income;
- areas of administrative and procedural deficiencies that
need correction;
- possible instances of fraud for further investigation; and
- areas for possible administrative, regulatory, or
legis]ative initiatives.
The Atlanta Project began in November 1980 and involved the
participation of seven other aaencJes (the Veterans
Administration, the Postal Inspection Service and the Departments
of Navy, Air Force, Health and Human Services, Agriculture and
Transportation). These aaenc]es are among the employers of the
largest number of FECA claimants.
The project involved the development of a profile of a high-risk
claimant likely to have received overpayments or other unent]tled
benefits. This profile was run against the per]od]c ro!l of
claimants in the Atlanta Region. The periodic roll consists of
- 3 -
those claimants receiving long-term disability compensation on an
automatic basis without the reouirement of an individuaI clalm for
each compensation payment•
This process identified approximately 3,000 claimants who met the
criteria of the profile, of whom 1,810 were identified as
originally having been employed by the participating agencies. A
comparison was then made of these claims with records of wages
paid by private emp]oyers in the states within the region to
determine whether or not income or wages had been reported to the
state unemployment offices for these clalmants.
The 1,810 claimant fi_es then were reviewed individually to
identify those that warranted further investigative or
administrative attention to determine if the clalmant had
unreported income and the extent of the claimant's ability to earn
wages when disability lessens (wage earning capacity) and to
assure that current medical evidence supported continuing benefits.
The project disclosed a number of administrative shortcomings in
the processing and management of claims, most notably:
- Insufficient analysis of files by claims examiners as
indicated by medical evidence inconsistent with the injury;
- lack of follow-up on reouests for medica] reports and lack
of referrals for impartial medical examinations;
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- inadeouate efforts to detect unreported income;
- insufficient or conflicting _nformation in files;
- inadeouate investigation of _njuries by employing agencies;
- inadeouate follow-up by employing agencies to help control
compensation costs; and
- inadeouate attempts to rehabilitate and re-employ _njured
employees.
As a result of the initial review, approximately ]35 of the 1,810
files reviewed were identified as needing additional investioation
by the employing agency and 827 files were referred to OWCP for
follow-up attention due to identified administrative
discrepancies. To date, OWCP has terminated or suspended benefits
to 67 claimants resulting in savings of $572,000 annually. As a
result of the project, ]lO criminal Jnvest_.oat_ons have been
initiated, and additional cost savings will be identified when the
cases are completed.
The resu]ts of the Atlanta Project have led to the expansion of
the project to a]l regiona] offices. Th_s national FECA project
began in August ]98]..
The degree of cooperation and support of the seven agencies
participating in our investigative projects has demonstrated that
employing agency participation is crucial to reducing the costs of
- 5 -
the program through the elimination of fraudulent claims. W_th
some exceptions, employing aoencies do not give adeouate attention
to thelr responsibilities under the FECA program.
Several cases investioated by OIG during the period of this report
support the finding that there is inedeouate effort on the part of
OWCP to detect unreported employment by FECA claimants during the
period that compensation Js paid. With the exception of scheduled
awards (_.e., fixed, lump-sum, or term-payments), FECA claimants
may not be employed wh_le receivino compensation. Examples of
related cases follow.
• A former posta] worker was charged in a la-count indictment
with collecting disability payments for an al]eoed injury at
the Philadelphia Post Office. Durino the time he was
collectlng payments, from 1977 through 1980, he was a
full-time employee with another organization and his duties
included such things as instructing and participating in
basketball and swimmino. (United States v. Branson, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania)
• An air traffic controller, disou_lified for duty due to
work-related stress, was found to be employed as a tractor
trailer driver, while cert_fyino to OWCP that he was not
employed. The claimant was indicted and plead guilty to two
counts of makino false statements in order to continue his
disability benefits. He received a suspended sentence and
signed a promissory note to repay $52,096 at 12 percent
interest. (United States v. Whitehead, Northern District of
Georgia)
• A oenerai machinist at Brookiey Air Force Base in MobiIe,
Alabama, sustained a back injury in 1954 and was medJcalIy
disoualified from performino his duties. He was receiving
total disability benefits from OWCP at the rate of $864 every
four weeks. An investioat_on showed that the man had been
involved in construction work since 1973 and had faIsifled
reports to OWCP concerning his emp]oyment. He was indicted
in August 1981 on four counts of making false statements,
includino false statements to obtain FederaI Employees'
Compensation. (United States v. Dawsey, Southern District of
Alabama)
- Inadeouate Attention Paid to Safeouards in Bill Payment
Operations
The payment of medical bills under FECA has been automated since
1978 with approximately $119 million paid during Fiscal Year
1981. Despite controls desioned to minimize losses through fraud
and erroneous payments, we have found that inadeouate attention is
paid to safeouard_no bill payment operations. As a result of an
- 7 -
embezzlement in the bill payment operation in FECA District Office
25, we conducted a loss vulnerability assessment of operations in
six FECA district offices. The areas reviewed were bill payments,
claims processing, manual compensation payments, mail and file
operations, and computer security.
Sianificant problems in the bill payment system include:
- The lack of standard fee guidelines for amounts approvable
for medical fees;
- the lack of separation of functions in the bill payment
area, i.e., the person who approves the payment also
_ssues the payment;
- Jnadeouate supervisory review of bills approved for
payment to ensure ouality and prevent fraud; and
- inadeouate verificet_on of whether medical services were
actually provided.
- Medical Provider Fraud
Durina the reporting period, OIG special agents participated in
several joint investigations in the area of medical provider
fraud; two are described below.
• A physician was indicted on 9_ counts in an insurance and
mail fraud scheme in which he Js alleoed to have received $2
million in payments for false claims. One-third of the
counts involved fraudulent FECA claims such as bil]ino FECA
over $123,000 for treating one claimant for two on-the-job
injuries between 1975 and 1979 when the injuries resulted in
less than five weeks loss from work. In September 19£1, a
$500,000 settlement was reached to be divided between the
Departments of Labor (to receive $286,000) and Health and
Human Services. (United States v. Kones, Southern District
of New York)
• A physician plead OuJ]ty to one count of mai] fraud and one
count of filing a false claim to the Federa] Government that
was related to a false FECA claim. The physician was placed
on probation for three years, fined $9,000 and ordered to
spend 250 hours in community service employment. (United
States v. Dent, District of Columbia)
We are expanding our investigative work in this area and are
exploring joint efforts with other federa] agencies to better
control medical provider fraud.
- Legislative Changes
In the draft bi]l, Federa] Employees' Reemp]oyment Compensation
Amendments of ]981, the Administration has proposed changes in the
current FECA ]eoislet_on. The major chanoes proposed _nc]ude:
- 9 -
- Setting the new compensation rate at 80 percent of
pre-disability spendable income and eliminating
augmentation for dependents in order to provide claimants
with a greater monetary incentive to return to work;
- replacing Continuation of Pay provisions with a seven-day
waiting period before a claimant can receive compensation,
thus reducing the number of minor claims;
- requiring the conversion of workers from FECA to the
retirement disability rolls at ape 55; and
- establishing compensation . for a scheduled award injury
(e.g., loss of a toe) as a lump-sum amount, separate from
any appropriate disability compensation, thereby
eliminatlno the current Jneouities that result from basing
the scheduled award amount on salary and not allowing
disability compensation during the scheduled award period.
OIG has recommended two additional changes to the legislation:
- the debarment from participating in FECA of those medical
providers who have engaged in certain types of misconduct;
and
- increasing the FECA criminal penalty from a misdemeanor to
a felony for submitting false statements to obtain
benefits, filing false reports, or willfully withholding
reports.
- I0 -
Black Lung Benefits Prooram
The Black Lung Benefits Program, managed by ESA's Division of Coal
Mine Workers' Compensation Proorams (DCMWC), pays benefits
(monthly compensation payments and medical diaonostic and
treatment costs) to coal miners who are totally disabled from
pneumoconiosis (black luno) aris_no from their coal mine
employment.
In lg73, the administration of the prooram was transferred to the
Department of Labor from the Social Security Administration (SSA)
under Part C of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969. Part B of the Act continues to be adm_nlstered by SSA.
The 1977 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, in changino the
standards for determining disability, called for the payment of
benefits either from a Trust Fund (when the miner's last coal mine
employment was before January 1, 1970) or by the responsible coal
mine operator (RO), if ident_flable, when the miner's last coal
mine employment is on or after January 1, 1970.
The changes in the prooram resulting from the enactment of the
1977 amendments caused a rapid and slonif_cant expansion in the
program as shown in the chart on the followino paoe.
- 11 -
Black Lung Total Compensation $726
and Medical Benefits Paid
(Dollars in Millions)
$583
$30
$1 $7 $14 $19
Fiscal 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Year
Note: Thegraph doesnot reflectthe$6,132,O00paidduringthethreer'nonth Fiscal Year t979 and Fiscal Year 1980
iiscal year transition period, July 1 through September 30+ 1976. payments include lump-sum retroactive
payments for claims re-examined
pursuant to the 1977 amendments.
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During the reporting period we conducted two studies of the Black
Lung Program. The first of these efforts was directed at
identifying systemic vulnerabilities to loss existing in the
program's payment procedures and processes. Through an evaluation
of existing legislative and regulatory provisions, documentation
of procedures and processes, and the observation and analysis of
actual operations in se]ected offices, major deficiencies that
could lead to resource loss were identified and recommendations
for corrective action were developed.
In the second study, OIG staff reviewed and eva]uated the actual
operation of the Program's automated claim tracking and benefit
and medical bill payment systems. Automated records were then
searched for payments having characteristics indicating a
potential loss (e.g., duplicate payment of benefits to the same
clalm or for the same medlcal service, payments for dependents
over the age of eligibility, and payments to persons having
invalld social security numbers). Overpayments identified in this
way were compared to recoveries, and estimates of historical and
contlnuJng ]oss were prepared together with recommendations for
corrective action.
A total of 64 deficiencies Jn payment procedures, automated system
operations and data base content, maintenance, and management were
identified in these two studies. These deficiencies can be
attributed to three major problems found by both studies:
- 13 -
inadeouate management priority aiven to the identification and
prevention of loss, deficient computer systems, and poor interne]
controls.
Our examination of automated payment records found evidence that
these deficiencies have resulted in estimated loss, through
unrecovered overpayments, of $35.6 million (2.6 percent of all
payments) from Black Lung systems. This includes a $33 million
Ioss from benefit payments between July 1973 and November 1980,
continuing at a rate of $9.2 million annually; and a $2.5 million
loss from medical payments between January 1977 and November 1980,
continuing at a rate of $i.6 million annually.
Our analysis of the computer data showed:
- 35,0S5 duplicate payments for medical services;
- benefit payments to 1,033 cIaimants, and 1,047 payments
for medical services recorded as havinq been performed,
after the date of death recorded for the ciaimant;
- 68 claims receiving monthly benefit payments and 418 cases
where medical payments were made by the program after the
responsible mine operator had assumed responsibility for
the claim;
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- 9,759 claims reflecting benefit payments _n excess of
maximum limits;
- 3,570 claims reflecting payments for dependents who had
exceeded the age of eligibility; and
- approximately 210 claims receivinG multiple monthly
benefit payments.
Our evaluation of the automated data also revealed that bas_c
payment control mechanisms were not routinely applied _n
oenerBting payments. We also found $44.3 million in payments (3.7
percent of the total) made without consideration of bas_c
validation criteria (approximately $9 million of this amount is
also reflected in the overpayment amounts above). Deficiencies in
procedures for processing and enter]no data into the automated
systems and the lack of internal controls and automated computer
checks have contributed to this problem.
Although the time period considered was from 1973 to 1980, 95
percent of all payments were made by the Black Lung ProGram during
1979 and 1980. While we had planned to support our computer
analysis through an examJnation of case files, the aoency delayed
nearly two months in orantlng access to the case files. Given the
seriousness of the problems disclosed by our computer analysis and
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the need for prompt corrective action, we decided to issue our
report based on the analysis of the automated systems data. We
have completed a review of some case file materials (limited to a
sample of medical payments as a result of resource constraints).
The results of that review will be reported in the next semiannual
report. Preliminary results indicate, however, that our analysis
of the automated systems may have substantially understated the
actua] level of resource loss.
Recommendations in our reports outline specific steps to be taken
to alleviate current problems and to avoid future problems.
- Inadeouate Attention to the Identification and Prevention of
Loss
Our studies found a lack of priority given to the identification
of current ]asses and the prevention of future losses on the part
of Black Lung Program management. For example, until recently, no
budget or planning document had evidence of any speclfie
commitment of resources to any objective not directly related to
increasing the speed of processing claims and issuing payments.
We are aware of the demands placed upon the program by the 1977
amendments to the Act. However, many of the deficiencies that led
to the loss discussed above could have been easily prevented
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without the commitment of extensive resources and without the use
of sophisticated technical expertise.
For example, shortly after the initiation of the OIG studies, the
proaram implemented a new computer check in the automated payment
systems that has eliminated approximate]y $50,000 per month in
duplicate benefit payments. This procedure required only 12 lines
of comDuter program ]anouaoe. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of
this check was diminished by the fact that the listing of deleted
payments was not forwarded to claims processors, who may have
reissued some of these payments manually.
A further indication of the lack of attention to controls over
payments is that some of the same problems identified in the two
OIG studies were reported in a 1979 study by the Secretary of
Labor's Management Improvement Committee. There was no evidence
of actions to correct those deficiencies at the time of the OIG
work.
Finally, it must be noted that although many of the states with
large concentrations of Black Lung benefit recipients have state
proarams compensatlno Jndlvidua]s for black luna, only 300 out of
the 7a,O00 monthly benefit recipients had offsets for state
compensation reflected in their records. Also, at the time of our
studies, the program was not a_oressively pursuin0 the
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identification and assignment of responsibility for payment of
claims by responsible mine operators.
Several recommendations relatino to this lack of manaoement
commitment to the identification and prevention of loss are
contained in the studies, includ_no the establishment of a
permanent loss control unit reportino to the Director of OWCP.
- Computer System Deficiencies
In our view, a major contributing factor to most of the payment
system vulnerabilities and resultant loss is the lack of a unified
computer system incorporatino sufficient edit, control, and
security procedures to ensure the integrity of program data and an
accurate accountino of payments. The Black Lung automated systems
operating at the time of our studies were virtually independent of
each other, with only lim/ted on-line capability for the
verificatJ.on and reconcil/ation of data amono the systems, and had
only limited, and easily by-passed, data inteority and payment
control procedures.
Our studies found that both the cla/m process/no procedures and
the automated systems were incapable of properly responding to the
massive increase in workload enoendered by the 1977 amendments.
The program failed to recognize the maonitude of the problems
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created by these deficiencies for at least a year or more and
failed to act effectively to correct them once they were
recognized.
We have recommended a large-scale redesign of the Black Lung
Program's computer systems. In addition, the problems identified
in our studies warrant immediate interim action to correct
existing system deficiencies.
These include changes to allow periodic reconciliation of data
entry, data modification, and automated record creation aoainst
authorized levels; collect_on of additional data sufficient to
provide an adeouate audit trail of all computer-based
transactions; implementation of spec]fically described data checks
designed to eliminate the most serious payment system
deficiencies; and a comprehensive evaluation of the security of
all Black Lung automated systems and data.
- Inadequate Internal Controls
The lack of effective internal controls in medical and benefit
payment operations has caused major vulnerabilities in the Black
Lung Program. Financia] control and accountino mechanisms are so
deficient that we are convinced it is impossible for the program
to determine the actual amount paid to any claimant without a
review of the microfilm copy of checks maintained by the
Department of the Treasury.
" 19 -
These problems become particularly acute in the area of medical
payments. One claimant, having made a decimal error in computing
his travel expenses (reimbursable under the prooram legislation),
submitted a bill for $i79.00 instead of $12.90. Not only did
program staff not identify the orioinaI error, but they also
proceeded to issue a check for over $13,000.
Even the most basic financial controls, accountino for returned
checks, are so deficient that the prooram did not know that
approximately $30,000 in returned checks had been stolen between
its mail room and payments section. Files contained copies of the
returned checks; and logs, with entries made on the basis of the
photocopies, reflected the returns. Even after being notified of
the theft by the OIG four months aoo, the proqram has still not
_nitiated the cancellation procedures reouired for the Treasury
Department to recover the funds.
Numerous recommendations were made for corrective action in this
area. For example, we proposed that re-validation of payment
records be initiated as soon as possible and be continued on a
periodic basis; a complete evaluation of the Black Lung accountino
system be undertaken; l_sts of individuals approved for various
payment processing functions be developed; uniform criteria be
established for determinino acceptable treatment costs; security
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safeguards be insta]led; and fiscal controls he implemented to
insure accurate, comprehensive payment and recovery records for
each individual account and for timely reporting and analysis of
program fund transactions. Also, a number of improved payment
screenino and verification and claim maintenance procedures were
recommended.
- Recent ESA Corrective Action
We would like to acknow]edoe recent actions taken by ESA
management to address a number of the problems noted above.
First, the Deputy Under Secretary has established within his
office the Internal Control Unit (ICU) for the purposes of
coordinating and monitorino agency efforts to prevent losses,
improvino internal controls and assuring the implementation and
consideration of OIG and GAO recommendations. The ICU is already
examining OIG-referred complaint cases and followino-up on several
OIG reports. Second, the agency has proposed a substantial
commitment of resources to address these problems in its Fiscal
Year 1983 budget. Third, the agency has issued a reouest for
proposals for a comprehensive claims tracking and payment service
contract. Implementation of the reouirements specified in the
contract should result in substantial improvements in many of the
identified problem areas.
d
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These are positive indications of the willingness of the agency's
top management to move aggressively to correct these problems.
However, we believe that contJnuino attention is needed within
OWCP and the Black Lung Program if these major deficiencies are to
be overcome.
- Leaislative Problems
In addition to the systemic problems discussed earlier, the OIG
has been concerned about various statutory provisions that may
have caused Black Lune prooram loss throuoh improper payments or
that, through eligibility provisions, may have caused payments to
be made when proof of black lung could not be definitively
established. The Administration has recently proposed a number of
changes to the Black Lung Benefits Act that would improve
operation of the program from a fraud, waste, and abuse control
perspective. Several of the more sionificant problems are
discussed below.
-- E]JQihility ReQuirements
The ]977 amendments made a number of chanoes in the evidentiary
and elioibility reouirements for Black Lung benefits. These
included chanoes to various special provisions, called
"presumptions," that allowed surrogate criteria, e.g., number of
years of coal mine employment (coupled with evidence of
i
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respiratory impairment), to be used for benefit eligibility,
instead of direct proof of black lung. The effect of these
presumptions has been that miners and survivors of miners have
received benefits without establlshino absolute proof of black
lung.
The Administration has proposed eliminating three of the
presumptions: (1) the presumption that a miner with ten years of
coal mine employment, who died as a result of a respiratory
condition, died as a result of black lung; (2) the presumption
that a miner with 15 years of coal mine employment and a totaly
disabling lung impairment is totaly disabled due to black ]ung;
and (3) the presumption of e]igibi]ity of survivors of miners who
worked 25 years in the coal mines prior to 3une 30, ]971, and who
died before March 1, 1978.
-- Prohibited Re-Readino of X-Rays
Current law prohibits the Department of Labor from re-read,no
X-rays to determine whether black lung is present when the
following conditions exist:
- There is other evidence that a miner has a pulmonary or
respiratory impairment;
- there is no evidence of fraud; and
- the X-ray was taken by a radiologist or oualified
technician, is readable, and was read by a board-certlfied
or board-elioib]e radlolo_ist.
- 23 -
The most expedient way to identify an erroneous reading of an
X-ray is to re-read that X-ray. The Administration's proposal
would eliminate the current prohibition against re-reading X-rays.
-- Use of Affidavits for Eligibility Purposes
Under the present law, affidavits attesting coal mine employment
and symptoms of black lung disability from widows and others who
have s financial interest in the claim are sufficient to establish
claim eligibility. This increases the potential for claim
determinations based on falsified evidence.
The Administration bill proposes that, when there is no medical or
other relevant evidence, these affidavits not be accepted as
sufficient proof that the miner was totaly disabled due to black
lung. These affidavits would have to be substantiated by
affidavits from others with no direct financial interest in the
disposition of the claim.
-- Potential Double-Billing
Since inadeouate coordination exists to preclude duplicate
payments, there now exists the possibility that both the Black
Lung and Wedtcare systems can be hilled for medical payments for
Black Lung claimants.
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The Administration bill proposes that the initial responsibility
for medical payments for black lung payments be transferred to
_edicare. This would reduce possible overpayments in this area.
In addition to these provisions, we believe that stronger
statutory provisions are needed to ensure that offsets with other
benefit programs are made. Our studies found that offsets for
state Black Lung compensation payments were reflected Jn only 300
out of 74,000 monthly benefit payment records; and, also, noted
that this is a ouestionably low f_gure. With the exception of
Part B benefits, administered by SSA, this is the only offset to
Department of Labor payments permitted by the Act.
Another situation that we find particularly troublesome is that
former miners, disabled from coal mine employment and receiving
black lung benefits, may be employed in other, less strenuous,
occupations with no offsets for earninos applied to their
benefits. For example, some ex-mJners currently serve as
full-time MSHA mine inspectors. While we support efforts to
occupationally rehabilitate and employ disabled miners, we feel
that for periods of time during which ex-mJners are gainfully
employed, offsets for earnings should be applied to black lung
benefits.
- 25 -
In addition to these legislative issues, we are troubled by
Section 725.542 of the Black Lung reoulations that states that no
recovery of an overpayment will be made in any case where the
recipient is without fault and recovery would defeat the purposes
of the B]ack Lung Reform Act or "be against eauity and good
conscience."
Program staff have _nterpreted this provision to mean that the. Act
prohibits recovery of overpayments resulting from administrative
error when the recovery would impose a "hardship" on the
recipient. We do not believe that the program is reouirJng enough
evidence to support a hardship claim. We believe that the
standards set forth in the Federal Claims and Collection Act of
1965 provide a more concrete basis for making such decisions and
urge that these standards be rigorously applied and that complete
documentation of hardship be obtained prior to any waiver of
government recovery rights.
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EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) budget authority
for employment and training programs for Fiscal Year 1981 was
$28.8 billion, including the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund.
The Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund was budgeted for $18.8
billion and the Comprehensive Employment and Training programs
were budgeted for $7.6 billion. The remaining funds were for
other ETA activities, such as federal unemployment insurance
proorams and programs for older Americans.
CETA Grants to State and Local Prime Sponsors
The largest of the employment and training programs administered
by ETA are those authorized by the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act of 1973 (CETA) and subseouent amendments to that
Act. CETA grants to state and local prime sponsors in Fiscal Year
1981 amounted to approximately $5.9 billion. ETA estimates the
Fiscal Year 1982 expenditures at about $3.3 billion.
The oeneral purposes of the programs funded by these grants are to
provide work trainino and work experience to the disadvantaged,
unemployed, and under-employed. The 1973 Act, as amended,
provides that these programs be funded by direct grants to prime
sponsors (now 478), which consist of state and local governments
w_th populations of i00,000 persons or more, who are responsible
for tailorino the proorams to meet local needs.
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For the past several years, we have conducted more audits and
investigations of CETA prime .sponsors than of any other single
program in the Department. During this reporting period, we have
continued our intensive audit and investlgative coveraoe. The
following is a description of some of the problem areas identified
by OIG activity and our recommendations for corrective action. A
detailed presentation of audit data is contained in the OIG
Activities Section.
- Resolution of Audit Findings
In past semiannuml reports we described the problem of the
increase in the number of unresolved audits. As of Warch 31,
1981, the backlog of unresolved audits over six months old was 794
reports containing unresolved audit exceptions of $303 m]lllon.
Some of these reports had gone unresolved for as long as nine
years. ETA accounted for about 97 "percent of the Department's
open audit findings.
In January 1980, a grant and audit closeout task force was
established to close out grants and contracts, to collect debts
owed to the Department of Labor, and to provide technica!
assistance to grantees and contractors. In July 1981, this task
force combined efforts with an adjunct task force, and nearly all
resources were redirected solely to eliminate the unresolved audit
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backlog. As of September 30, 1981, the Department's backlog had
been eliminated, with the exception of e_ght reports, the
resolutlon of which was precluded elther by active investlaatlons
or by ongoing resolution activity at the subgrantee levels. This
is illustrated in the followlno chart.
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In addition to resolving the audit reports issued prior to March
31, 1981, 51 new audit reports issued during the current six month
period were resolved, bringino the total amount reso]ved durino
this reporting period to $301 million (836 reports). Of the $301
million resolved, grant officers have disallowed $103.8 million
(34 percent). This amount has now entered the debt collection
process.
Illustrative of the magnitude of this accompl_shment, our audit
resolution campaiqn has resulted in a seven-fold increase in the
rate of audit resolutions -- $301 million resolved _n the past six
months ($50 million per month) compared with $164 million resolved
in the preceedino two years ($7 million per month). This is shown
in the follow_ng table. More detailed statistics are provided in
the Appendix.
Audit Resolution Activity
(dollars in millions)
Six Month Reportino
Period Endino Dollars Resolved
September 30, 1979 $ 15.0
March 31, 1980 26.6
September 30, 1980 56.6
March 31, 1981 66.9
September 30, 1981 301.0
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This major financial management accompl_shment has been achieved
as a result of the strono commitment to audit resolution by ETA
management. ETA, working closely with OIG, reallocated priorities
to provide sufficient staff resources for the project.
Efforts taken by the Department to resolve the audit back]oo and
to install an effective permanent system for audit resolution
include:
- Procedures to resolve differences between auditors and
prooram managers that arise durino the development ann
resolution of audit reports,
- automated systems to record and track the resolution of
audit disa].]owances through collection or final
disposition,
- trainino for grant officers and their technical support
staffs in audit resolution, and
- inclusion of audit resolution reouirements in the Senior
Executive Service performance standards of program
managers.
- Debt Collection
ETA has taken several steps to improve debt collection in the
agency, including establishino an accounts receivable system to
track debts to final resolution and incorporating debt collection
as an SES standard for prooram managers. In addition, ETA h_s
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developed a plan of action, in accordance with OMB Bulletin 81-17,
that includes basic goals and milestones for improvements in the
area of debt collection. A training program on debt collection
has been developed for prime sponsors, so that they can better
resolve problems in this area with their subgrantees. Prior to
Fiscal Year 1981, ETA had col]ected $6.2 million in debts in the
entire eioht year history of the CETA proQram. By contrast,
during the first nine months of Fisoa] Year 198] alone, ETA
collected $8.1 million.
- Ineffective Monitorin9 of Grantees and Subgrentees
Recipients of CETA grants (prime sponsors) award suborants to
approximately 40,000 subgrantees or program service deliverers.
Effective management principles and CETA regulations reouire that
management systems be _nsta]led at both the prime sponsor and the
Suborantee levels to assess proorams, identify the need for
corrective actions, remedy Door grant performance, and plan for
more effective Droorams. In the past, OIG audits and
_nvestigetions have shown that less-than-effective monitoring
systems have resulted in the failure to detect or correct\
w#de-ranaina deficiencies at the subgrantee level. These
deficiencies include violations of cost limitations, inaccurate or
incomplete accountino records, participation of ineligible
persons, and inadequate documentation of financial and program
activities. Prime sponsors are responsible for resolving any
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Questioned costs resulting from audits of subgrantees and are
liable to ETA for unallowable subgrantee costs. Activities
related to subgrantee operations accounted for 31 percent ($17
million) of ouestioned costs resulting from all CETA prime sponsor
audits conducted during this reporting period. Effective
monitoring systems would have precluded many of the deficiencies
that resulted in ouestioned costs.
The CETA amendments of 1978, and implementing regulations, reauire
that Independen t Monitoring Units be established by prime
sponsors. Specific responsibilities assloned to the monitoring
units _nclude:
- Review of the systems controllino program administration,
particularly those that determine participant eligibility;
- review of pay records and attendance reports to ensure
that controls are established for preventing unauthorized
payments;
- review of subgrantee plans, procedures, and capability to
carry out programs and activities; and
- monitoring of subgrantee maintenance of records for ali
expenditures of CETA funds.
Although CETA regu]ations provide that the units be operational by
April 3, 1979, OIG audits have shown that most were slow to he
staffed, which delayed or prevented effective monitoring of
suborantee activities.
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Following are specific examples of weaknesses in implementing the
monitoring unit concept, as found during our most recent audits.
• Knoxville/Knox County Manpower Consortium, Tennessee
Although this prime sponsor had established an Independent
Monitoring Unit, our audit disclosed the following weaknesses
in the unit's effectiveness:
- Numerous suborantees were not monitored during the
performance period of the grant;
- findings disclosed in monitoring reports were not resolved
by subgrantees, and follow-up by the prime sponsor to
ensure that corrective actions were taken was insufficient;
- established written procedures were not always followed by
the monitoring staff in conducting their reviews; and
- reports depicting the results of monitor_nq reviews were
not 81ways presented to a high enough level of management
to ensure that appropriate corrective actions would be
taken.
At the time of our audit, this prime sponsor had over $13
million in unresolved ouestioned costs from prior audit
periods, of which $4 million pertained to suborantees.
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m Texarkana Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium
An Independent Monitoring Unit had also been established by
this prime sponsor, with duties and responsibilities to
monitor all aspects of the CETA program from information
generated by the management information system to at least
semiannual monitoring of a]l subgrants. However, an OIG
audit disclosed that most of the staff's time was used to
gather eligibi].ity data on potential _ne]ioih].e
participants. The monitoring staff did not even have a
comp]ete listing of suborantees.
Q Madison County Employment and Training Administration_ Indiana
Our audit of this prime sponsor disclosed that, as of
September 30, 1980, its Independent Monitoring Unit was still
in the formative stage. Therefore, monitoring of individual
programs was not being conducted on a timely basis.
Financial records maintained by three out of seven
suborantees selected for audit were in an unauditable
condition. Because these three suborantees were unab]e to
provide supporting documentation for costs charged to their
program, or were unable to reconcile reported expenditures to
official accounting records, $65,000 was ouestioned.
At the time of our audit, $112,000 Jn ouestJoned costs
resulting from subgrantee audits remained unresolved. These
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ouestioned costs were for audits cover/no periods between
September 1974 and September 1978.
The prime sponsor, in accordance with our recommendations,
has taken steps to increase its monitoring efforts.
Approximately $44,000 of the total $112,000 suborantee
ouestioned costs was resolved during the time between
issuance of our draft audit report and issuance of the final
report.
- Inadeauate Financial Manaoement and Internal Controls at the
Prime Sponsor and Suborantee Levels
OIG audits have noted problems in financial manaoement and
internal controls at both prime sponsor and subgrantee levels.
Our recent review of cash management practices _n the CETA program
disclosed a number of cash management deficiencies, including the
fact that CETA recipients have failed to provide effective control
over CETA cash balances. We also found that the system of
interna] controls at the prime sponsor and suborantee levels was
inadeouate. We found controls that permitted payment of
expenditures unsupported by documentation; administrative costs
charged to grants that exceeded the amounts authorized by statute
or regulation; expenditures that exceeded budget authorizations;
charges that did not conform to government cost principles; and
improper eouipment, procurement and control procedures. Further,
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inadeouate controls have rendered the CETA program more
susceptible to fraud, waste and abuse. Deficiencies in financial
management and internal controls at the prime sponsor and
suhgrantee levels resulted in amounts ouestioned totaling $35
million.
To address these problems, ETA initiated corrective actions
including: redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of
Federal Representatives, with emphasis on monitoring grantee
internal control systems; issuance of a certification guide for
review of prime sponsors' Financial Management Information
Systems, including specifications for a payroll journa] system;
inclusion in the Annual Performance Assessment of reouirements for
maintenance of documentary evidence of participant eligibility
verification; and development for issuance in late 1981 of a
certification guide for review of prime sponsor control of
subgrantee cash balances.
Following are examples of audit findings relating to poor
financial management systems and poor systems of internal control,
as found during our most recent audits of CETA prime sponsors.
-- Poor Grantee Cash Management Practices
For several years we have been pointing to the need for more
effective cash management practices within the CETA program.
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During Fiscal Year 1979, the DOL provided $9.4 b_llion in federal
funds to over 500 recipients to finance employment and training
programs. Another $_ billion was provided Jn Fiscal Year ]980.
Cash advances were made to these recipients to fund their CETA
activities.
Our recently completed review of cash management practices in the
CETA program disclosed that CETA recipients have failed to provide
effective control over CETA cash balances. Federa] efforts to
control advances to recipients have been similarly ineffective.
Because this control was lackino, recipients often had either
excessive cash balances or insufficient cash to meet their needs.
These problems are the result of ineffective recipient accounting
systems that did not provide CETA cash managers with the
information necessary to maintain minimum cash balances, federal
payment procedures that did not prevent the accumulation of
excessive cash balances, and control practices that did not
identify inadeouate recipient cash management.
As a result, the Federal Government incurred additional interest
costs when more funds were borrowed than necessary to meet
immediate needs; local governments were deprived of interest
earnings when local funds were reouired to meet CETA cash
disbursements; and CETA suffered loss of ouhlic support when funds
were not available to meet participant payrolls and other
reouirements.
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In addition, recipients have allowed subrecipients to retain
unexpended government funds for extended periods of time after the
contract period. Recipients have also derived interest from
federal funds but have not returned the interest earned to the
Department, as reouired.
Our auditors examined the cash management practices of seven
recipients in four regions who collectively received 54 percent
($6 bi]Iion) of all CETA funding in Fiscal Year 1979. OIG
recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for ETA for improving
cash management in the CETA program were as follows:
- Perform an assessment of recipient accountino systems to
identify deficiencies in cash management practices.
- Provide necessary technical assistance to establish
adeguate controls over CETA balances.
- Consult with the U.S. Treasury to explore alternative
methods for disbursing federal funds to reduce the oeriod
between reauest and receipt of funds as well as eliminate
the uncertainty as to when funds will be received. (This
would almost certainly reouire a method other than the
mail system for reouesting and mailing funds. Eliminating
use of the mail system for disbursing checks, alone, would
, reduce interest costs to the U.S. Treasury by $8.8 million
per year.)
I
i
- Notify recipients of their obligation to ensure that all
government funds unused at the completion of a contract be
promptly returned by subrecipients, or reproerammed into
current activities.
- Develop incentives and training to make financial, budget
and program managers more aware of the cash manaoement
implications of their decisions.
- Direct a review of all recipients at the local government
level, to ensure that procedures are in place for
identifying and returning interest earninos accruing on
CETA balances to the U.S. Treasury. Added emphas_s should
be placed on monitoring recipient compliance with these
procedures.
ETA concurred with all our recommendations and cited actions
planned to correct the deficiencies found. They stated, however,
that they do not have the staff to assess recipient accounting
systems and to review recipients to recover interest earned on
CETA balances. Instead, ETA suooested a number of alternative
approaches, includino hav_no the OIG perform the assessments.
While we agree that ETA does not have the skilled accounting
personnel to adeouately address these problems, we feel the
potential savings are so significant that the recommendations
should be implemented as soon as feasible. The shortage of
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skilled accountfno personnel could he addressed through use of
technical assistance trainino funds to procure the necessary
expertise or throuoh the formation of an OIG/ETA task force,
drawing upon the technical expertise available within the OIG.
• Maricopa County I Arlzons
The financial reports submitted by this prime sponsor to ETA
disclosed material discrepancies. Reported expenditures were
overstated by $560,000 due to an undetected clerlcal error,
and there was an unreconciled difference of $116,000 in the
cash account. In total, we ouestloned $1.1 miIllon in
program expenditures.
These problems existed because of the Iack of adeouate
accounting procedures and controls. The accounting system
consisted of poorly maintained and unlahe]ed manual records
that were constantly revised durino the audit. No clear
audit trail existed between the financial reports and source
documents.
• Municipality of Cargllna , Puerto Rico
Our audit of this grantee disclosed that its flnanclal
management system was inadeouate to properly administer the
CETA program. The prime sponsor exceeded its $971,000 Title
IID appropriation by $56,000 and made wage overpayments of
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$452,000 to its staff and participants. These overpayments
were due to the lax preparation of time and attendance
records and the absence of formal leave records. Other
financial management weaknesses included a lack of an
established system for documenting or verifying travel costs,
an unclear delineation of authority and responsibility that
resulted in many routine payments being delayed and in some
unusual payments receiving little or no scrutiny, and
unsupportable payments. Recommendations were made to
strengthen the grantee's financial management system.
-- Improper Eouipment Procurement and Control Procedures
OIG investigations have identified significant probiems with
respect to CETA prime sponsor eouipment control and procurement.
These include:
- Procurement of major eouipment (over $i0,000) without
specific justification or approval by the grant officer;
- use of "lease with option to buy" contracts to avoid sole
source and procurement authorization reouirements;
- rental of government-furnished eouipment to CETA programs
to generate income for other uses;
- furnishing major eouipment items ($10,000 & over) to
private businesses for "classroom training" where the
eouipment is used for a limited period and then retained
by the contractor; and
- failure to maintain property records.
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These problems appear to stem from ETA's inadeouate efforts to
enforce prime sponsor adherence to federal regulations and to take
substantive action where violations are noted. Annual p]ans and
grant proposals contain]no unidentified budgetary amounts for
eouipment acouisition are approved at the beginning of each fiscal
year, thus providing the funding authorization to procure such
eouipment. Attempts to obtain property listings for prime
sponsors reveal that ETA normally does not have such information
or that the information _s not current. Without accurate property
records, re-utilization or recoupment of eouipment by the Federal
Government is not possible.
- Ineligible Participants
As noted in our last three semiannual reports, one of the most
prevalent problems in the CETA orooram is the enrollment of
ineligible participants. During this reoortino period, $20
mi11_on was ouestioned in OIG audits due to possible ine]ioible
participants.
In many instances, ineligible participants may be enrolled in the
CETA program because of an error by the intake staff or by the
participants. In many other instances, however, their enro]lment
may be due to willful fraud. Such CETA fraud is the subject of a
significant port,on of OIO investigative effort. As noted in our
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last semiannuaI report to the Congress, CETA employees are
sometimes coached to falsify their enroIiment appiicatlons to
ouaiify for a CETA position. In one recent case, a subgrantee
director coached appIicants to falsify their addresses to be
eIigible for the CETA program and also paid participants for a
forty-hour work-week when they actuaily worked thirty-two hours
per week. On the basis of this investigation, ETA disallowed
$48,333 and instructed the prime sponsor to recover these funds
from the subgrantee.
The CETA amendments of 1978 provided for elloibi]ity determination
and verification systems to be placed at ail prime sDonsors.
Under the 1978 reQuirements, a full and complete app]icatlon is
the basis for estabiishina participant eliglbiIity in the CETA
program, Within 30 days of enroiIment, ali appiicatlons are
reviewed by someone other than the intake officer for compieteness
and consistency and to verify that the determJnatlon regardlno
eliglbility was correct. A ouarterly verification of participant
eIigibillty is performed, based on a random sample of participants.
In our last semiannuaI report, we reported that the OIG had
completed its evaIuation of the CETA eligibility determination and
verification systems of selected CETA prime sponsors and that the
draft report had been submitted to ETA management for review and
comment. The objective of our study was to identify aspects of
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prime sponsors' eligibility determination and verification systems
that could be used as a model by other prime sponsors to improve
their participant screening process. Although we identified a
number of practices tending to characterize effective sponsors and
to distinguish them from their less effective counterparts, we
also found that those characteristics did not lie in the area of
specific screening applications or technioues, but in manaoement
support, direction, and staff competence and diligence.
Our study recommended that ETA: DeveloD training programs and
guides that prime sponsors could use to train their staff;
encourage less effective prime sponsors to reoulre Dre-enrollment
documentation until they strengthen those areas of their
enrollment and verification systems identified as needing
improvement; and determine which prime sponsors have not
implemented their @uarterly Verification System and recover
administrative funds allocated to them to implement the system.
While ETA offlclaIs agreed that some prime sponsors are in need of
better tra_nlng programs, staff guides, policies, and procedures
in the screening area, they felt that, in some instances,
implementation of our recommendations would reoutre too much
natlonal intervention at the local level.
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- CETA/Pub]ic Service Employment Unemployment Insurance Refunds
CETA statutes have always provided for participation of Public
Service Employment (PSE) workers in the Unemployment Insurance
(UI) prooram. The Emergency Jobs Proorams Extension Act of 1976
(P.L. 94-444) transferred the liability for UI benefits from CETA
grant funds to the Special Unemployment Assistance Fund in the
budoet of the State Employment Security Agencies (SESA's).
The Act reouired the Federal Government to pay directly any UI
benefits to individuals whose claims were based on employment in
the CETA/PSE program. The states were directed to make refunds to
or to credit the accounts of employers who had made contributions
to the Unemployment Insurance prooram on behalf of PSE
participants. ETA issued specific instructions to prime sponsors
stating that these credits and refunds to PSE emp]oyers should be
recaptured by the prime sponsors for use in subseouent CETA/PSE
proqrams.
The OIG conducted a survey to determine if, in the State of
California, these employer refunds were returned to the prime
sponsors as instructed. Out of $2.26 million that California had
refunded to employers, we reviewed $1.9 million and determined
that of this amount only $949,000 had been properly returned. Our
survey has already resulted in the recovery of $367,000. The OIG
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recommended that ETA take immediate steps to recover the remaining
$587,000.
Office Of National Programs
The Office of National Programs (ONP) Js responsible for those
proqrams funded from CETA appropriations administered directly
from ETA headauarters in Washington. These include employment and
trainina programs for Indians and other Native Americans, for
migrant and seasonal farmworkers, and for older Americans.
Oblloations for these Droorams totaled $600 million in Fiscal Year
198] and are expected to total approximately $494 million in
Fiscal Year 1982.
During the final months of the past admlnlstration, a large number
of teleorams were sent to contractors and grantees, authorizing
them to incur costs before actual awards were finalized. These
awards were made from CETA Title III discretionary funds
administered by ONP and from Title IV funds administered by the
Office of Youth Programs. Further, although actual obligatlons
never exceeded available funds, as of January 30, 1981, planned
commitments for Titles III and IV discretionary funds did exceed
available funds by $7.3 million for Title III and $35.4 million
for Title IV. The ONP proorem staff became aware of the potential
overcommitment at the end of January 1981 and action was taken to
reduce T_tle III and IV proposed and executed awards by $25 and
- 47 -
$42 million respectively, bringing planned Fiscal Year 1981
expenditures in line with the Department's budget authority. In
early March of 1981, the OIG initiated a still-ongoinq
tnvestioatton of some of these award activities.
At the reouest of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee,
GAO issued two reports Jn Auoust 1981 dealino with problems in
ONP: "Labor Needs to Better Select, Monitor and Evaluate Its
Employment and Trainino Awardees" and "Information on Funding
Commltments From Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Titles
llI and IV Durino Fiscal Year 1981."
GAO noted in these studies that ONP relied heavily on sole source
awards with oeneraIly little or no justification for such awards.
Other observations made by GAO include the followino. ONP rarely
made formal assessments of the awardees' performance and,
therefore, did not know whether awardees fulfilled the award terms
or spent federa] funds prudently. Problems with awardees'
performance were not always identified or resolved; reouired
fiscal and performance reports were often not reouesfed, and many
awardees were never visited. Awardees that had performed poorly
continued to receive orant funds.
Many of ONP's problems occurred because orant and contracting
responsibilities were not separated from program
- 48 -
responslbilitles. As a result, most award activities were handled
by program staff who placed little emphasis on following proper
grant and contracting practices.
ETA reduced funds that will be avallable in Fiscal Year 1982 for
non-formula, noncompetitive _lwards from $79 million, or 13 percent
of the total $600 mil]lon available in Fiscal Year 1981, to $42
mi11ion, or 9 percent of the total $494 million available for
Fiscal Year 1982. ETA will also carefully examine the posslbillty
of awarding a substantial share of the $42 milllon competitively
rather than noncompetjtively. Moreover, ETA has drafted pollcies
and guldelines to improve its manaoement of, and to assign
responslbllities for, the procurement process for use of National
Office, 3obs Corps and certain Reoional Offlce administered
funds. These policies provide, in part, that awards be made
competitively to the greatest extent possible, that sole source
awards be made only if justified and approved, that performance
assessments be made of all procurements over the preceedino three
years and be considered before making decisions to approve,
increase, or decrease the funding or period of performance of any
contract or grant, and that pre-award audlt reviews or surveys be
made of prospective awardees of over $250,000 who have not
received contracts with ETA in the preceedlng three years.
The policies also provide that: Personnel with program
responsibility for the contract or grant may serve neither as
contract or grant officers, nor constitute a majority or serve as
chairperson on a panel that rates applications for contract or
grant awards; preaward authorization letters must be in accordance
with the Federal Procurement Regulations' reouirements for letter
contracts to protect the Government's interests; pre-award
authorization telegrams are prohibited; and a system be developed
to review and track contractor and grantee financial and program
reports and performance. Fina]ly, the draft policies provide that
ETA administrators shall consult with the OIG concerning
contractors and grantees before recommending any funding,
refunding, or increase in the amount of a contract or grant.
The OIO and ETA are deve]oping a process to better synchronize the
timing of audits and contract grant decisions. ETA plans not to
fund any grants with serious adverse audit findings or debt
delinouency. A preaward orantee clearance process will provide
information to ETA to ensure that this policy is enforced.
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MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 transferred
authority for enforcement of health and safety standards from the
U.S. Department of the Interior to the U.S. Department of Labor.
The 1977 Act also included enforcement of standards for the
metallic and nonmetallic mining industry, as well as the
previously regulated coal mining industry. Within the Department,
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) administers and
enforces the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977.
The objective of MSHA is to achieve a safe and healthful
environment in the nation's mines. This involves conducting
investigations and inspections of metal, nonmetal, and coal mS.nes;
assessing civil monetary penalties for violations of the Act;
certifying eouipment and materials for use in mines; examining,
approving, and monitoring industry plans to ensure compliance
under the MSHA Act; promulgating standards for mine safety; and
developino programs and materials to train mine inspection and
technical support personnel.
The 1977 Act reouires 8 complete inspection of each underaround
i
mine at least four times a year and a complete inspection of each
surface mine at least twice _ year. In addition to these regular
inspections, the 1977 Act renuires perJodic spot inspections in
those mines where excessive ouantities of methane gas _re
released; where other gas ignitions or explosions have occurred
durino the previous five years, resulting in death or other
serious injury; or where other hazardous conditions are present.
The mining industry, subject to the 1977 Act, includes nearly half
a million miners working in over 21,000 mines. The number of
persons employed in these mines ranges from one person operators
to corporate entities employino over 2,000 people.
MSHA was budgeted at $154 million for Fiscal Year 1981 and
employed a workforce of approximately 3,800 people.
The following is a description of some of the problem areas
identified by OIG activity and our recommendations for corrective
action.
- Weaknesses in the Approval and Certification of Mine Safety
Products
We recent]y completed an audit that focused on the product
approval and ouality assurance monitoring systems used by MSHA's
Approval and Certification Center (ACC). The ACC mission is to
ensure that products used in the mines are safe. To carry out
this mission, ACC personnel test and evaluate products to
determine if they meet safety specifications prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor. If the product meets the specifications, the
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manufacturer is allowed to display an MSHA approval plate that
indlcmtes the product is safe for mine use and can be marketed to
mine operators. The Center, which has 85 permanent staff,
receives approximately 5,500 reouests for product certifications
annually and has received over 22,500 reouests since 1978.
A 1980 OIG investigation of ACC operations raised concerns about
possible preferential treatment being oiven to manufacturers in
the product approval process, and about MSHA's inability to
identify and remove unsafe products from the mines. For these
reasons, we reviewed the product approval process and ouality
assurance monitoring systems operated by ACC personnel. Our audit
found that the Center cannot effectively carry out its mission
under the current concept of federal evaluation and testino of
prototype mine eoulpment.
Our review of the current operatJno systems identified the
following:
- As a result of the high volume of applications and limited
staff resources, there are large continuing backloos of
unprocessed applications for product approval that will
not be eliminated under the current operating concept.
- No patterns of preferential treatment in processino
approval actions were detected. However, we understand
....how someone unfamiliar, with ACC o'perating systems could
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suspect preferential treatment, since the ACC has at least
i5 major scheduling iines for processing approval actions
that resuIt in different time frames for product aoproval
actions.
- A review of 58 products being evaluated by the ACC
indicated that 97 percent had incomplete file
documentation.
- There are weaknesses in management systems for track,no
the progress of applications. For example, in 22 of 58
files reviewed, we could not ascertain when the
application had been assigned for testing and evaluation.
- There is a strong service attitude on the part of ACC
personnel that sometimes results in a failure to reject
Jnadeouate or incomplete applications for approval of
products. In one case, ACC personnel completely
re-designed two pump units for a manufacturer because the
original design did not meet safety specifications.
- The ACC is ineffective in monitoring previously-approved
MSHA products to ensure that they continue to meet federal
safety reouirements. Of the 88 products reevaluated
during Fiscal Year 1981, 23 (26 percent) of them were
found to be unsafe for mine use, indicating the need for a
stronger monitoring and reevaluation function.
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Based on our findings, we have recommended procedural improvements
to expedite processino and provide more effective manaoement
control in ACC's current operating environment.
However, the lack of an a:deouate ouaiity assurance monitoring
prooram raises serious ouestions about whether products carrying
the MSHA approval continue I:o meet federal specifications and are
safe for mine use. These problems are compounded by inconsistent,
outdated, and unclear MSHA regulations that govern the approval
process. The fee schedules, which are published in the
regulations, do not come close to recoverino the cost of product
testing. The result of the low fees has been to shift the costs
for product approval and ouality assurance from manufacturers to
the taxpayer.
While additional staffing for ACC would reduce backloos and allow
for increased quality assurance reviews, such staff increases are
unlikely and would provide only a short-term solution because of
anticipated increases in applications. Therefore, we believe it
is appropriate to consider alternatives to the existing approval
and certification concept. We have recommended that the Assistant
Secretary for Mine Safety and Health implement alternatives to the
current operating concept that would allow:
- Manufacturers to use third party, independent laboratories
to evaluate and test products in accordance with MSHA
specifications; and
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- MSHA to accept manufacturers' testlno and certification
that certaln types of less-hazardous mining products and
accessories meet federal specifications.
Furthermore, coupled with the shift in the operating concept, the
govern]no federal reoulations need to be streamlined, updated, and
clarifled.
We believe implementation of our recommendations will:
- Provide greater flexlbillty to manufacturers and MSHA in
desionino and approving safe mine equipment and eliminate
long delays for approval; and
- better utilize ACC technJcal expertise to Derform quality
assessment reviews and identify hazardous products and
s_tuations.
In response to our report, MSHA officials stated that they are
already taking action to implement changes. They further
indicated that many issues raised by the report paralleled their
own concerns, agreed that the current approval concept needs
modification, and stated that they are committed to making the
necessary changes. However, MSHA management did point out that
the current operating concept was beoun in the early 1900's and
rspld change may be difficult.
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- Enforcement
During this reporting period, there were 15 MSHA-related
indictments. Some of our major investigations of the MSHA
enforcement program ere discussed below.
• On June 8, 1979, an explosion at the Belle Isle Salt Mine in
Franklin, Louisiana, resulted in the death of five miners.
Under the 1977 Act, MSHA is reouired to classify a mine as
aassy when certain conditions are met, _ncludlno when the
test sample contains .25 percent or more of flammable gas.
Investigations have borne out the allegation that, prior to
theexplosion, MSHA personnel were aware of the presence of
methane in the Belle Isle Salt Mine and other salt mines in
the area since readings at these mines exceeded the .25
percent limit.
On May 27, 1981, an MSHA sub-district manager was indicted by
a federal grand jury in Lafayette, Loulsiana, on a
three-count indictment of conspiracy to obstruct proceedings
related to the Bel]e Isle Salt Mine investioations. This
sub-district manaoer, who had orior knowledge that the m$ne
was gassy, did not or,oper]y disclose this information nor
properly enforce the MSHA Act. During the Jnvestigat!on,_ it
was revealed that the sub-distrlct manager had Previously
instructed his employees not to classify the salt mines as
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Oassy. It was aIso disclosed that he heid a meeting in 1976
w_th the representatives of the southern Louisiana salt
mines, in which he notified the representatives that one of
the salt mines that should be classified as oassy wouid not
be so classlfled.
The sub-dlstrlct manager piead guilty to conspiracy to
defraud the oovernment of its right to have the Mine Safety
and Heaith Act administered falrly and free from corruption.
Sentencing is pending.
On May 2V, 1981, the U.S. Attorney filed a four-count
crlmlnal Inform_tlon charoJng Cargill, Inc., the owner and
operator of the Belle Isle Salt Mine, with violatino the
mandatory health 9nd safety standards established by the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act oC 1977. On May ?9, 19_1,
Caroill entered a oullty plea and the U.S. Attorney
recommended that Caroil] pay a $100,000 fine. On September
I, 1981, Carol11, Inc. was fined $45,000 by the Federal
District Judge in Opelousas, Louisiana.
In addition, the survlvors of the mine disaster sued Cargiil
Inc., who settled out of court for $8 million.
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• On October 28, 1980, three men were killed in an explosion
while working in an illegal underground coal mine in Corbin,
Kentucky. Althouah the OIG does not aeneral]y investiaate
mine safety and health violations, the U.S. Attorney in
Lexington, Kentucky, reouested that the OIG provide technical
assistance. The OZG assisted the U.S. Attorney by conducting
_nterviews, preparing subpoenas and affidavits and compiling
the documentary and physical evidence.
As a result of this investipation, on June 5, 1981, a federal
grand jury in London, Kentucky, indicted six individuals on
forty-four counts for violating safety standards and for
operating an illegal mine. Trial is scheduled to begin in
November 1981.
• On June 22, 1981, a former MSHA coal m]ne inspection
supervisor was convicted in Roanoke, Virginia. This coal
mine inspector had owned and operated the same mine that he
had the responsibility for inspecting. He was charoed with
violatino conflict of interest laws and with submitting false
statements.
• The OIG also conducted an_,investigatJon into allegations that
a former MSHA mine inspector solicited and received
interest-free loans with no repayment terms from coal
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companies in the Richlands, VirglnJa, coal belt. On July ]5,
1981, the former mine inspector was charged with three counts
of extortion, two counts of receiving illegal gratuities and
two counts of fi]ino false statements. The president and
vice-president of the mlnino company were also charged with
giving illegal oratuities. This case is awaiting trial.
• The OIG conducted an investigation into allegations that an
MSHA district manager obstructed investloatJon and inspection
activities of subordinate inspectors in his district. There
were additional allegations that the district manager
accepted gifts and gratuities from the coal companies. MSHA
proposed removal of this employee but he subseouent].y
retired. On July 6, 19_I, a federal grand Jury in
LouisvJl]e, Kentucky, returned a seven-count JndJctment
against the distr_ct manaoer. The indictment charged the
manager with six counts of obstruction of Justice and one
count of accepting a bribe. A trial is scheduled to heoln in
November ]98].
MSHA manoement is aware of all of these JnvestJoatJons and the
recommendations we have made as a result of our work. We are
concerned that, in the past, _SHA has not heen as sensJtlve to
Jnteority issues as it should be. A particularly troublesome
example, concerns an MSHA employee, previously suspended for
taking a gratuity, who was subseouently assigned by MSHA to teach
an ethics course at a district office.
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DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Within Departmental Manaoement, the OIG directed audit activities
to the procurement area. The Department undertakes numerous
procurement actions each year that total about $400 mi11ion. Of
particu]ar interest to us durino this reporting period were
year-end spending and consultant service contracts.
- Year-end Spending
We evaluated the adeouacy of controls implemented by the
Department in Fiscal Year 1980 to eliminate unnecessary year-end
spending and to find out if funds oblioated related to services
reouired on]y during that fiscal year.
We found that manaeement controls needed improvement and that $1.3
million was improperly oblioated to Fiscal Year 1980.
In response to our findings and recommendations, the Department
promptly took a numher of actions. The agencies reviewed by the
OIG were immediately told to adjust their accounting records by
deobligating the $1.3 million improperly charged to Fiscal Year
1980 appropriations and to charge those obligations to Fiscal Year
1981. In order to avoid the improper obligation of Fiscal Year
1981 funds, procuremeht personnel were charoed with reviewing
existing L contracts and new procurement reauests to assure that
only [he appropriate _&ar's funds were oblioated. Add]tionally,
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the Department provided immediate verbal guidance on future
procurement actions to agency administrative personnel, and is now
revising internal directives to provide permanent guidance on the
proper manner for obligating funds.
Based on our recommendation, the Department will ensure that the
existing reouirement of preparing annual advance procurement plans
is enforced. Such plans lay the groundwork for fulfil]ino agency
procurement needs and enable agencies to p]an for the best use of
their budgeted funds. Additionally, the Department's Procurement
Review Board will review and approve these plans and their
amendments, thus enabling the Department to initiate needed
corrective action early in the fiscal year.
In light of the results of our review of Fiscal Year 1980 year-end
spending, we examined procurement actions for the last two days of
Fiscal Year 1981. The preliminary results of this audit effort
indicate significant improvement in the Department's obligating
procedures. We believe these improvements can be attributed to
the Department's timely response to correct the deficiencies cited
in our earlier review.
- Consultant Service Contracts
We evaluated the Department's manaoement controls over consultant
service contracts to find out if contracts were correctly
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classified as consultant services and if contracts were properly
reported to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which is
the oovernment-wide data base used to monitor government
purchasing for the information of the Congress and the Executive
Branch.
The specific prob]ems we identified were the misclassification and
misreportJng of consultant service contracts to the FPDS and a
resultant inaccurate reporting of the money obligated for such
services--Departmental accounting figures differed significantly
from those reported to the FPDS and also differed with data
presented to the Congress. For example, for the first six months
of Fiscal Year 3981, one of the Department's major procurement
offices had classified nine contracts for consultant services
valued at $805,053. We identified an additional three contracts
va]ued at $484,958. As a result, the Department's reportino was
undervalued by almost 40 percent.
Based on our recommendations, Departmental officials have been
directed to take specific actions to improve the classifying and
ouantifying of consultant service contracts and to report accurate
figures to the FPDS. Additionally, the Department is implementing
a new reouirement that will preclude the processing of any
consultant purchases that are not included in approved procurement
plans or approved amendments to such plans.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND LABOR RACKETEERING
An historic problem in the labor/management field has been the
influence of organized crime.
An assessment of the organized crime and labor racketeering
problem in the United States, conducted by our Office of Organized
Crime and Racketeering (OOCR) and other law enforcement agencies,
found that over 400 labor organizations are associated,
influenced, or controlled by organized crime.
Investigations of organized crime and labor racketeering cases, by
their very nature, are lengthy and comolex. In Fiscal Year 1981,
investigations conducted by OIG special agents, including those
conducted jointly with special aaents from other law enforcement
agencies, resulted in 43 indictments against 93 individuals, many
of whom are top level members of organized crime families.
Four major areas of criminal activity in which organized crime
members are involved and that have received concentrated attention
from OIG special agents are: embezzlement, extortion, kickbacks
(to employee benefit plan officials to influence their
administration of such plans), and illegal payments from employers
to union officials.
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- Embezzlement
Unlon-negotlated emDloyee benefit plan funds and labor union funds
wlth their billions of dollars are vulnerable to embezzlement,
especlally when oroanlzed crime is involved.
This type of criminal conduct usually involves the very willino
participation of dishonest union officials, as in the case of
Daniel Cunningham, president of the Allied International Union of
Security Guards and Speclal Police (Allied) and the Federation of
Special Pollce and Law Enforcement Officers. In a 50-count
indictment returned against Cunnlngham and two business agents of
the union, Cunn_ngham was charged, in August 1981 in New York,
with embezzling approximately $160,937 from union and benefit fund
coffers over a flve-year period by forgino union and fund checks.
Wlth business agent Herman Jaffe, Cunningham was also charged in
the Jndlctment with embezzling $4],814 by converting Allied union
checks made out to fictitious employees and an add_tional $35,000
by cash_na fictitious employee checks with the assistance of
business aaent Frank Ponte. The total amount the three union
offlclsls are charged with embezzling was approxlmately $239,800.
- Extortlon: Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence
Extortion is defined in the Hobbs Act as "the obtaining of
property from another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of
offlclal right." Employers who want their cargoes unloaded or to
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keep their businesses open too freouently are forced to bow to
extortionate demands. Althouoh the problem is perhaps more
prevalent in the construction industry, no bus_ness is immune as
shown by an intensive two-year--and still onooing--joint
investigation by OIG, the New York Police Department, and the IRS
of the fresh seafood industry centering in the Fulton Fish Market,
which generates approximately 25 percent of all seafood business
on the Atlantic Coast.
The investigation revealed that the industry is influenced by
oroan_zed crime members and their associates. Their infiltration
is reflected in all aspects of market activity, including its
major union--the United Seafood Workers and Handlers Union
(affiliated with the United Commercial Workers Union) in New York.
In Auoust 1981, a federal orand jury in the Southern District of
New York returned an 167-count indictment against three officials
of local 359, United Seafood Workers Union, and its associated
welfare and pension plans and five businesspersons associated with
Various wholesale fish companies in the Fulton Fish Market.
The 'indicted union officials include Carmine Romano, executive
administratGr of the Ful{on Fish Market welfare and pension funds
anU _formeriy {he secretary-treasurer and busine:ss _agent of local
359. According to various law enforcement _gencies, Romano is an
alleged high-level organized crime figure.
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Also indicted were Romano's brother, Peter Romano,
secretary-treasurer and business agent of local 359, and Anthony
O'Connor, cousin of the Romanos' and trustee of the welfare and
pension fund and a former business agent of the local.
The defendants are charge_' with conducting and conspiring to
conduct the affalrs of the Fulton Fish Market through a pattern of
racketeering activity that included numerous acts of extortion,
payment and receipt of illegB1 labor payoff, misuse of the union's
welfare and pension funds, and obstruction of Justice. The union
officials are charged, in part, with extorting over $644,000 from
businesses in the market through the Fulton Patrol Service; the
payments were made in return for "protection" agalnst thefts and
robberies. Two union and five employer defendants are also
charged in 70 counts with extorting "Christmas" payments averaging
$300 apiece from employers in the market.
- Kickbacks
To influence operation of emp]oyee benefit plans, kickbacks --
usuallv monetary -- are given in payment. The large sums of some
kickback schemes, such as that uncovered in a two-year
investigation by OIG, FBI, and IRS of the Laborers International
Union of North AmerlcB, o_ve us an idea of how much orgaoized
crime gains at the expense of union members enrolled in health and
welfare and pension.programs.
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In June lqal, 16 defendants--inc]udino Anthony Accardo, alleged
Chicago syndicate boss; Santo Trafficante, 8]]eged Tampa organized
crime boss; and Angelo Fosco of Chicago, president of the Laborers
International Union of North America (LIUNA)--were indicted on
charges of racketeering vio]ations through a pattern of insurance
kickback schemes. In September, five other defendants--includlng
Raymond L. S. Patriarca, al]eged organized crime boss in New
England, and Arthur E. Cola, Sr., secretary-treasurer of
LIUNA--were also indicted on charges of racketeering.
The indictments state that the scheme, which operated from i970 to
]977, was to get money for the defendants and co-conspirators by
setting up or purchasina insurance companies, exercising influence
over unions and trust funds to funnel insurance business from
those funds into the insurance companies, charging union members
for the most expensive form of insurance, and lootinq the
insurance premiums paid by using them for kickbacks, pay-offs,
unearned salaries and fees, and improper personal expenses. The
union insurance business was funneled into a nationwide company
that Joseph Hauser, a convicted insurance swindler who became a
government witness, was to arrange. Hauser's company received
over $39 million from various employee benefit plans and over $3
million was allegedly kicked back.
\
The grand jury also charged in the indictment that, during 1976,
Pstrlarca advised Hauser that the insurance business of the
Laborers Un_on would be controlled by "the family" with Patrlarea
controlIing the northeastern United States, Trafficante
contro11in9 the southern United States, and Accardo controllfng
the midwestern United States.
- Illeoal Payments
Illegal payments are payments or loans of money or other thinos of
value by employers, or individuals acting in the interest of
employers, to union representatives or labor organizations,
usually in return for favors, such as influencing contracts or
union operations.
A recent convlctJon in Delaware, followlng a lenothy OIG
investlqation, establlshed that Eugene R. Boffa, Sr., with the
participation of other co-defendants, masterminded a nationwide
network of labor leasinq companies that speclalized in leaslno
truck drivers to major corporations throuahout the country. These
companies operated under various names, includin9 Universml
Coordinators, Inc., Country Wide Personnel, Inc., and Preferred
Personnel, Inc. They employed several "front" people who posed as
officers of various of these companies.
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The defendants would interchanoe the companies as necessary to
circumvent contractual employee wage and benefit reouirements, or
other problems as they arose, by terminating contracts with one
leasing company and bringing in another leasing company that paid
lower wages and benefits. Boffa and his co-conspirators were
always careful to conceal his actual ownership of the successor
companies, and thus defrauded a large number of employees.
Evidence at the trial established that Francis Sheeran, president
of Teamsters Local 325 in Wilmington, was an active participant in
this operation for which he received several luxury automobiles
and an undetermined amount of Boffa's profits. Trial evidence
showed that alleged high-level organized crime figures also shared
Jn the profits.
Boffa was convicted in June ]9£] on charges of operating the
]_easing corporations through a pattern of racketeering, maJ]
fraud, and illegal payments. He was sentenced in August 198] to
20 years imprisonment.
The Sheeran trial, which began October 13, 198], is st_]]
underway. The other co-conspirators have been convicted and
sentenced. The judge ordered that nine companies owned by the
defendants be forfeited to the government and appointed a receiver
to prevent the dissolution of assets during appeals.
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While labor ]easino is not in itself an undesirable method of
conductina business, the Boffa case illustrates the vulnerability
to "sweetheart" contract arrangements--a form of labor management
collusion in which the employer pays the union representative to
negotiate lower waoe rates: or benefits than the market would
permit, to allow the employer to use non-union labor, or to fail
to enforce the collective baroaining agreement.
The facility with which companies and ]ahor can be manipulated and
the sophistication of transacting seeminely leeitimate business
make this an area of orowing concern.
- Leois].ation
Two bills now under consideration that greatly affect the method
of conducting investigations into organized crime activities in
the labor management area and the outcome of such investioations,
and which we support, are S. 1153, Labor Racketeering Act of 1981,
and S. 613, Amendment to the Hobbs Act, developed by the
Department of Justice.
-- The Labor Racketeerino Act of 1981
In May 1981, S. 1163, the Lahor Racketeering Act of 198] was
introduced to increase the penalties for violations of the
Taft-Hartley Act, to prohibit persons upon their convictions of
certain crimes from hold_no offices in or certain positions
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related to labor organizations and employee benefit plans, and to
c]arify certain responsibilities of the Department of Labor.
The act assigns responsibility to the Department of Labor for
detecting and investigating civil and criminal violations of the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and related
federal laws. Previously, the Department has interpreted its
authority to pertain only to civil violations. The OIG believes
it is necessary to have the authority to investioate criminal
violations as well.
There has never been any specific leoislation giving the
Secretary, and ultimately the IG, statutory authority in organized
crime and labor racketeering cases to investioate crimlnal
violations contained in the federal labor laws. The Labor
Racketeerino Act of 1981 (S. 1153), could appropriately clarify
the ro]e of the Labor Department in the Department of Justice
Organized Crime Strike Force and its authority to investigate.
-- S. 613 - Hobbs Act Amendments
In March 1981, S. 613, a bill that, emono other purposes, includes
amendino Section 1951 (Extortion) of the United States Code, was
introduced. Portions of the b_11 would nullify the decision in
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973). The Supreme Court
found in Enmons that the Hobbs Act does not apply to the actual or
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threatened use of violence directed at the obtaining of
"legitimate labor objectives" or economic benefits that can
otherwise by lawfully obtained by collective bargainina. In
addition to nullifyino the Enmons decision, S. 513 would also
clarify the position, in the context of both labor disputes and
disputes outside the field of labor relations, that the Hobbs Act
punishes the actual or threatened use of force or violence to
obtain _ property irrespective of the leoitimacy of the
extortionist's claim to such property.
This leoislation is important and, if enacted, would he]p deter
labor racketeering and enhance Departmental investiQative
effectiveness.
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PART II
SUMMARY OF OIG ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
Between April 1 and September 30, 1981, we opened 270 cases and
closed 303. We referred 52 cases to the Department of Justice and
other authorities for possible prosecution: Additionally, 83
cases were referred to DOL agencies for administrative actions
that resulted in various actions including two reprimands, two
demotions, and nine terminations of employment. At the end of the
reporting period, there were 597 cases pending.
During the six-month period, there were 50 individuals or entities
indicted and 30 convicted based on our investigations. (Since the
period of time to obtain court action on indictments varies
widely, the 30 convictions are not necessarily related directly to
the 50 indictments.)
Fines, recoveries, savinos and collections resultino from our
investigations during this period totaled about $4 million.
The following is a breakdown of investigative case activity by DOL
agency for this period:
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SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
April 1 - September 30, 1981
Cases Cases Individuals Individuals
Agency Opened Closed Indicted Convicted
Labor Statistics 3 - - -
Employment Standards 128 115 19 15
Employment Training 96 142 16 Ii
International Labor - I - -
Affairs
Labor-Manaoement a 2 - -
Services
Mine Safety and 6 9 15 4
Health
Administration and 2 4 - -
Manaqement
Occupational Safety ]1 18 - -
and Health
Office of the 3 1 - -
Secretary
Solicitor 5 2 - -
Other 2 2 - -
TOTALS 270 303 50 30
Examples of some of our most significant investigations follow.
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Employment Standards Administration
• An Office of Workers' Compensation Programs bill payer in
Washington, D.C., was indicted in 3uly 1981 on charges of
defrauding OWCP of approximately $52,000. She was previously
convicted for issuing 65 fraudulent checks from OWCP. Her
husband was subseouently ind_cted in Baltimore, Maryland, on
12 counts of aiding and abett_no the theft of government
property. (United States Vo Linda Moore, United StaLes v.
Sterling Moore, Distr_ct of Columbia)
• A postal worker who reportedly injured her back in 1974 by
slipping on a rubber band and who had received over $77,000
in FECA benefits was indicted in September 1981. This is a
significant case for FECA because the indictment was based on
disproving the claim of injury, rather than the more common
indictment of Oivino false information. Our investigation
disclosed that the defendant was attending San Francisco
State University during the period of the c]aim and had
received a grade of A in tennis. (United States v. Dorothy
Carr, Northern District of California)
• A Joint OIG-Secret Service probe has resulted _n the
indictment in July 19P1 of a DOL employee in Seattle,
Washington, who was charged wlth stealing $30,000 in
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compensation checks from OWCP. The defendant resigned
shortly after the _nvestloation began and is scheduled for
trial in October. (United States v. Frederick Smith, Western
District of Washinoton)
Employment and Training Administration
• A Trade Readjustment Act cialmant in Boston, Massachusetts,
was found to have heen gainfuiiy employed at the same time he
had received about $9,000 in benefits. He has aoreed to
pIead quilty to a one-count indictment and to make fuii
restitution. (United States v. Aldo Stabiie, District of
Massachusetts)
• As a result of a joint OIG-FBI investigation, the former
executive director of the Community Regional Opportunity
Prooram in Chicopee, Massachusetts, was sentenced in
September i98i to one year in prison, two years probation,
and ordered to make restitution of $7,550 by a U.S. District
Court in Springf_eid. The man had converted more than
$I?,000 in CETA funds to his own use by carrYing "no-show"
empioyees on the Dayroii. He had also extorted about $i,500
from the CETA-paid secretary by requiring weekiy kickbacks
from her saIary to keep her job. (United States v.
John L. CzeIusniak, District of Massachusetts)
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• A former deputy director of Americans for Indian Futures and
Traditions was sentenced in September 1981 in San Diego,
California, to ten years in prison for embezzlinq over
$24,000 tn CETA funds. (United States v. William Givens,
Southern District of California)
• A Joint investigatlon by OIG, the FBI, and the U.S.
Attorney's office in Newark, New Jersey, into allegations of
CETA abuses Jnvolvlno possible k_ckbacks, double billing, and
mismanagement, has resulted in nine indictments aqainst nine
defendants who have plead guJ]ty to felony and misdemeanor
counts. (United States v. Paul Peacock, United States v.
Brewer Brunson, United States v. Ethel M. Searles, United
States v. _atthew Ballister, United States v.
Joseph R. Caldwe]l, United States v. Arthur Fladoer, United
States v. Renee Starks, United States v. Robert J. Stover,
United States v. Ernest Seald, District of New Jersey)
• A CETA participant was indicted in Denver, Colorado, for
making false statements and subseouently plead guilty to
charges of obstructing an investigation. Based on a report
from the CETA Drime sponsor that a participant was holding
outside employment, the investigation confirmed that the
partlolpant worked n_ghts at a Iota1 p].ant where he earned
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from $Ii,000 to $16,000 a year while receiving CETA wages and
supportive services exceeding $9,500. (United States v.
Alvin J. Sais, District of Colorado)
• A joint investigation with the U. S. Department of
Aoriculture OIG has resulted in the indictments and
sentencing of a man and woman who operated a day care center
that was a CETA subgrantee. They plead guilty to conspiracy,
embezziment of CETA funds, and makino false statements. In
April 198I, the woman was sentenced to five years on each
count. Sentence was suspended and she was placed on
probation for three years; also, she wili not be allowed to
participate in any state or federal programs and she must
perform 15 hours community service per month. Imposition of
sentence on the man was suspended, and he was placed on three
years probation. (United States v. Fannie Triplett and
Calvin Triplett, Northern District of M_ssJssippi)
• Four officials of the Tribal American Consulting Corporation
in Los Angeles, California, were indicted in August 1981 on
charges of conspiring to defraud and embezzle the government
of $58,000 in CETA funds. The investigation, based on a
Questionable Activities Report of October 1978 from a former
bookkeeper, discIosed that DOL money was used to pay for
personal expenses, first-class air trips to Mexico, and a
I978 Porsche. (United States v. Sandy E. Gibbs et al.,
Central District of California)
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• ETA has instructed K_ng-Snohomish Manpower Consortium in
Seattle, Washington, a prime sponsor, to recover CETA funds
from the Operation Improvement Foundation (OIF). An OIG
investigation, based on the prime sponsor's allegations,
established that OIF had overbilled CETA $9,625 for building
space, had used $]6,000 in CETA funds budgeted for rent to
make unauthorized repairs to the buildings, and had earned
$53,000 by rentino several facilities in the bui]dinQ,
placJno the money in a special account and not reporting this
as program income.
• A regional director of the Veterans Employment Service in
San Francisco, California, entered a guilty plea to conflict
of interest charoes filed _n the U.S. District Court,
Washington, D.C., and was subseouently removed from his
official position with the Department. At the time of the
offense, the employee was the government's authorized
representative on several contracts, including three totaling
$21,000 in which he had a "kick-back" arrangement.
Mine Safety and Health Administration
• In April ]gB], the president of Tazco, Inc., a former MSNA
coal mine inspection supervisor, was indicted in Roanoke,
Virginia, on charges of conspiracy, conflict of interest, and
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filina false statements. He owned, operated and supervised
inspection of the Tazco Coal Company wh_le employed by MSHA.
He plead guilty to one count each of conf]ict of interest and
fJ]ino false statements, and received a three-year suspended
sentence, was fined $7,500, and placed on three years
probation. (United States v. Paul MerrJt et a]., Western
District of Viroinia)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
• An _nvestigation of an OIG hotline complaint confirmed that
the area director in an OSHA office ordered the timekeeper to
submit an amended false time card for him for a pay period in
January 1981. Federal prosecution was declined and an
Investigative Memorandum was sent to OSHA authorities.
Effective July 13, 1981, the area director was removed from
the federal service.
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OFFICE OF AUDIT
During this reportina period, 250 audit reports were issued on DOL
programs. Many of these reports outline deficiencies in
contractor and erantee operations. The audits were performed by
OIG auditors, state and local auditors, and CPA contractors. The
table below summarizes our audit activity by prooram area.
SUMMARY OF AUDIT ACTIVITY
April 1 - September 30, 1981
Reports Amount of Grant/Contract
A_ency Issued Exceptions I Amount Audited
ETA 223 $7_,903,144 $4,459,770,060
OSHA 17 _58,g64 42,557,432
MSHA 8 518,833 4,186,422
OASAM 2 - 325_460
TOTALS 250 $78,080,641 $4,506,839,374
I Throughout this report, audit exceptions include both
ouestioned costs and costs recommended for disallowance.
Ouestioned costs are expenditures without sufficient documentary
evidence for the auditor to make a conclusion on allowability.
Costs recommended for disallowance are expenditures that the
auditor judges, based on available evidence, to be unauthorized
under the terms of the grant or contract.
/'
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The followino chart provides another picture of the composition of
costs ouestioned, and it is followed by discussion of the major
activities by prooram.
Composition of Costs Questioned During the Current Period
April 1, 1981 through September 30, 1981
$78 million
$54.6
Other DOL Prograrr
$1.2
Employment and Training Administration
CETA Prime Sponsors
We issued ]33 audit reports on CETA prime sponsors. Of $2.2
billion audited, $55 mi]lion in grant funds was ouestioned due to
lack of documentation for expenditures or non-compliance with CETA
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reoulrements. Following is s list of audit exceptions, the number
of reports conta_nlng those exceptions, and the amount of audit
exceptions:
Number of Reports Amount of
Audit Exception With Exceptions Exceptions
Ineligible participants 84 $20,314,856
Unresolved subgrantee audits 96 17,392,187
Insufficient documentation 50 4,208,026
Unallowable expenditures 44 1,166,463
Cost lim_tstions exceeded 36 3,659,220
Improper allocation of costs 17 4,735,766
Inaccurate flnanclal reports 18 1,370,556
Other 45 I_786_315
TOTAL $54,_33,389
Four reports are described be]ow to illustrate the types of audits
conducted and the findlnos identlfled during the reporting period°
• Alaska Balance of State 2
The amount audited for the 2V-month period ending September
30, 1979, was $32.8 million. We ouestioned $261,000.
2 A balance of state prime sponsor covers those entities in a
state that, by themselves, are too small to oualify as a prime
sponsor.
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We reported that:
- Costs reported to DOL exceeded amounts recorded in the
state's official accounting records by $42,000;
- the state had erred Jn allowing $9,000 of subgrmntee
auestioned costs pertaining to nepotism and excess salary
payments; and
- the state had not recovered $2]0,000 of Questioned costs
that had been disallowed.
• Hawaii Balance of State
We audited $12 mi]lion coverJno a three-year period endino
September 30, 1979. We Questioned $206,000. The prime
sponsor failed to meet minimum trainlna requirements for
Public Service Employment programs, resulting in $181,000 in
Questioned costs. Also, for audits of subgrantees, $14,000
was charaed to the grants; however, no audit reports were
_ssued. Earlier suborantee audits contained $10,000 that had
not been resolved at the time of our audit.
• County of Venture, California
, Unlike most audits of Drime sponsors, which cover one or two
years, this audit covered five years--Auaust 1974 to the end
of Septemher 1979. The county received $57.4 mlllJon from
CETA over the five-year period and the auditors auest_oned
$77],866 and recommended $553,423 for disallowance.
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The report identified def_ciences that included:
- Lack of documentation to support expenditures,
- failure to reconcile grantee cash records to what was
reported to DOL,
- lack of an approved interest cost allocation plan,
- failure to refund $21,618 of interest earned on money
received from DOL, and
, failure to maintain current property records for fixed
assets.
A conclusive statement on the county's internal control
system was that a clear audit trail from financial reports to
support documents was lackino, and extensive reconstruction
of accountino records was necessary before costs could be
presented in report format.
An accountino svstem, w_th the shortcominos described in th_s
report, fails to provide management with accurate reports and
makes it possible to commit an error and not detect it easily.
o Mercer County_ New Jersey
For the 21-month period covered by this audit, we recommended
that $89,209 of the $9.9 million audited be disallowed.
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Many of the disallowed costs resulted from failures in the
grantee's financial management system, which needs
strenothenJng and is vulnerable to other abuses.
We reported that:
- Excessive waoe payments to participants resulted in
disallowed costs of $21,184;
- costs reported to the Federal Government exceeded the
incurred costs by $3a,870;
- of ]00 pattie]pant records selected for samp].]ng, 20 were
missino, resultino in euestioned costs of $15,897;
- of lO0 random]y selected waoe payments, 64 were made
without supportino attendance records (the grantee had
relied on telephone information from the work sites)
resulting in disallowed costs of $7,102; and
- lack of a system to resolve subgrant audit findings
resulted in disallowed costs of $8,391.
Until Mercer County develops better financial and internal
controls over its CETA prooram, DOL has no assurances that
such deficiencies will not recur.
Indian and Native American Grantees
Durino this reportino period, 22 audit reports coverino Indian and
Native American proorams were issued. Certified public accountino
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firms performing the work, under contract with DOL, collectlveIv
audited $14.4 million of which $70,509 was recommended for
disallowance and $155,014 was classified es ouestionahle. Costs
recommended for disallowance primarily resulted from ineligible
participants ($32,695) and lack of approved Indirect cost
allocation plans or other doumentation to support the allocation
of indirect costs ($?3,039). Costs classified as ouestionable
primarily resulted from the followino:
- Ouestionable participant eligibility ($53,782);
- lack of DOL approvals or improper charaes to the grant
proaram ($33,500);
- improper procurement procedures ($37,633); and
- lack of supporting documentation ($17,530).
Also, these reports include 57 procedural findings, detsllino
deficiencies in the grantees' administration of the prooram.
Of the 22 reports, 19 include findinos that disclose deflciencies
in the grantees' financial manaoement systems. The financial
manaoement system of the United Urban IndJan Club, Inc. was
seriously deficient and the CPA firm disclaimed an opinion on the
financial statements. Its system was not desJoned to provide
accurate, current, and complete disclosure of financial
transactions. A oenera] ledoer or journal was not maintained at
any time durino Fiscal Year 1979. Lack of a oenera] ledger or
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journal precludes any assurance that grant activities were
properly accounted for and precludes _deouate disclosure of assets
and 11abilltles. We recommended that the or_ntees' accounting
systems be reviewed durlno monitoring visits by ETA Federal
Representatives.
Miorant and Seasonal Farmworker Grantees
During this report_no period, 13 financial and compliance and two
indirect cost reports were issued on Miorant and Seasonal
Farmworkers Grantees. The total amount audited was $58.7 million
of which $1.8 m_llion was recommended for disallowance and $6.9
million class]fled as ouestionahle. Costs were recommended for
disallowance prlmarily because of:
- Improper contracting and procurement ($i,000,000),
- excessive administrative costs ($218,000),
- insufficient documentation ($180,000), and
- unresolved prior audit findings ($147,000).
The main reasons for the ouestionable costs were:
- Improper or unsupported allocation of costs ($4,700,000),
- insufficient documentation ($781,000),
- inellgible participants ($646,000), and
- improper contracting and procurement ($207,0P0).
• An _udit of the National Farmworkers' Service Center in
Keene, California, d_sclosed that the grantee had an
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inadeouate financial management system. This grantee was
awarded two DOL grants for a total of $804,78_. Incurred
costs were $705,504 of which $259,]04 was ouestioned mainly
because of oarticipants' ineligibility. Some ineligible
participants were not U.S. citizens or registered alienso
Other reasons for the ouestioned costs were inadeouate
supporting documentation, excessive administrative charges,
lack of reouired DOL approvals, and duplicate charges.
• An audit report on the Center for Employment Training in San
Jose, California, ouestioned $3.5 million of $7.4 million of
audited costs. Most of these costs were ouestioned because
the method used for the allocation of indirect and joint
costs was unsupported by reasonable documentation. Other
causes were Inadeouate supporting documentation, lack of
reoulred DOL approvals, undocumented participant eligibility,
and improper procurement procedures.
The auditors' opinion states that the grantee's reported
financial information was not presented fairly.
Specifically, the auditors found deficiencies in the
grantee's accounting svstem, indirect and joint cost
allocation plans, participant eligibility determination
system, payroll and personnel records, and monitoring and
evaluation of suborantees.
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Job Corps and Civilian Conservation Center Reviews
During this reporting period, 14 audit reports and one indirect
cost report were issued. These financial and compllsnce audits
covered $5? million in expenditures, of which we took exception to
almost $7 million. The reports note accounting system
deficiencies, insufficient documentation to support claimed costs,
and inadequate procurement procedures. The types and amounts of
audit exceptions are listed below:
Number of Reports Amount of
Audit Exception With Exceptions Exceptions
Undocumented approvals for
capital improvements i0 $4,842,814
Inaccurate financial
reports 12 1,669,511
Insdeouate procurement
procedures 10 94,505
Budget exceeded 6 44,]78
Undocumented approvals for
training projects 5 277,963
Insufficient documentation 2 661905
TOTAL $6,995,87_
Due to these exceptions, we recommended that accounting controls
and record retention procedures be strengthened.
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Office of National Proorams
During this period, ?8 audit reports were _ssued on ONP orants and
contracts awarded to public and private agencies. These awards
totaled over $4 mill_on. Three of the audit reports contained
exceptions totalin_ $26,000 of which $17,000 was attributable to
insufficient documentation, $7,000 for exceeding grant/contract
budoets, and $2,000 for participant ineligibility.
State Employment Security Aaenc]es
Six audit reports were issued on SESA's during this reporting
period. Of $2 billion audited, $5.9 mi]l]on was ouestioned mainly
because one arantee failed to eauate cash with expend]tures for
closed fund ledgers. The other ouestioned costs related to
insufficlent documentation.
o A f_nancial and compliance review was performed of the
administrative funds of the Office of Employment Security,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In addition, OIG reviewed
supporting summary records pertaining to federal unemployment
benefits and allowances.
The audit related to $SS7 million of federal funds, of which
exceptions totalino $5.7 million were noted. The most
significant exception noted was attributed to the grantee's
- 92 -
fai]ure to eouate cash with expenditures for closed fund
ledoers. As a result, the grantee had overdrawn $2.3 m_]lion
of federal funds. Also, because of insufficient
documentation to support cost appropriation transfers, $1.5
mill_on was ouestioned.
As a result of these findJnas, we have recommended that the
grantee refund $3.8 million to ETA.
• We audited the security of computer-based systems of the
State of Georgia Employment Security Aqency (GESA), and found
several deficiencies. The operatino system and many
application data systems could suffer from unauthorized
modification or destruction. Specifica]]y, access contro]s
were lacking for the operatino system, program library and
data files, app]ications systems, teleprocessino system, and
computer operations. In addition, the oua]ity contro], or
internal audit prooram_, was weak. For instance, there was no
on-goino prooram to independent]y review operations, security
policies and ouide]ines were lackino, procedures to detect
fictitious employers had not been adeouately imp]emented, and
agency-wide procedures for updat_no and access_no files were
lacking.
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We recommended several changes in policies and procedures to
upgrade the security of GESA's systems. GESA responded
favorably and plans to implement the fol]owing:
- Procedures to control access to the operating system,
program libraries and data files, application systems, and
teleprocessing system;
- formal standards or procedures for design of app]ication
systems;
- programs to allow security violation reporting to user
management; and
- procedures to improve entry controls over access to the
computer room and other physical security plans.
In addition, GESA is seeking additional funds to implement
our recommendations in the following areas:
- Standards and procedures for documentation of all grantee
systems and design of application system programs,
- ADP policles and guidelines for internal controls in GESA,
- an internal audit unit, and
- prior recommendations in our audit report entitled "Audit
of Unemployment Insurance Benefit Payment Controls."
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Eight financial and compliance audit reports of MSHA grants to
states totaling $4.2 million were issued this reporting period.
- 94 -
Five of these reports contained audit exceptions totallng $518,000
of which insufficient documentation was the most significant
exception noted as shown below:
Number of Reports Amount of
Audit Exception With Exceptions Exceptions
Insufficient documentation 6 $439,901
Improper allocation of
administrative costs 2 78193,_
TOTAL $518,833
OccupationaI Safety and Health Administration
During this reporting period, 17 audit reports were issued on OSHA
grants to states totalinQ $45.5 million. Audit exceotions
totaling $659,000 were noted in seven of the audits; of this
amount, $519,000 was attributab]e to one orantee that did not have
an approved indirect cost rate.
The followlna table summarizes the exceptions noted:
Number of Reports Amount of
Audit Exception With Exceptions Exceptions
No indirect cost rate 4 $605,389
Insufficient documentation 3 14,325
Unallowahle assessments
and penalties ? 13,_77
Budoet ex:ceeded 1 12,187
Unreported/understated
income 1 10,785
Costs charoed to wrono
period 2 2110]
TOTAL $658,664
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Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management
Two reports were issued on OASAM contracts for technical
assistance studies on the impact of proposed safety and health
standards tota]ino $96,000. No exceptions were noted in elther
report.
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OFFICE OF LOSS ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION
Between April i and September 30, 1981, four final loss prevention
reports were issued. These studies were undertaken to identify
major systemic vulnerabilities to waste, fraud and abuse and to
recommend corrective actions.
- Black Lung Loss Vulnerability Study
As the first phase of a two segment analysis of the Black Lung
Program, this study focused on loss vulnerabilitJes in claims
processing and compensation payment procedures to former miners
disabled from pneumoconiosis (black lung).
The study included an evaluation of the legislation and
regulations, as well as procedures and processes related to bill
and claCms payment, This report identified 40 areas of
vulnerability within payment system operatlons and proposed
corrective actions for each of the areas. The major
recommendations in this study included an integrated ADP system
and improved screening, control, verification and offset
procedures.
- Black Luno Automated Payment Systems Loss Assessment
The purposes of the second Black Lung Program study were to assess
historlal and continuing resource loss from automated payment
processes, identify weaknesses in the program's automated systems,
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and to recommend corrective actions designed to reduce future loss
and to provide for the early detection of losses which may occur.
The study identified an estimated $35 million in unrecovered
overpayments; $44 million in improper pavments made between 1973
and ]980; and a number of computer system and internal control
weaknesses. Amono our recommendations, we proposed a number of
computer system modifications; that action he taken to eliminate
continuino overpayments and to recover documented historical
overpayments; re-validation of payment records; and implemention
of improved f_sca] systems and controls.
- Loss Vulnerability Assessment of FECA Benefit Payment Prooram
Operations in Six District Offices
In September 1981, a report was issued on our loss vulnerability
assessment of six district offices of the Division of Federal
Employees Compensation, Office of Worker's Compensation Proorams,
ESA. Our assessment covered the bill payment, c]aims processino,
manual compensation payment, mail and file operations and computer
security for six offices responsible for receivino, examin_no,
adjudicating and pay_no claims filed under FECA. Th_s study
represented an expansion of an earlier study conducted in DistrJct
Office 25 in Washington, D.C.
The assessment was conducted over a three-month period and
involved an on-s_te review of operational procedures. Interviews
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were conducted with district office personnel, work flow was
tracked and monitored and a computer security survey was conducted.
As a result of this ana]ys_s, we concluded that there are a number
of procedural controls within the FECA benefits payments program
that, _f adhered to, can limit the susceptibility of the program
to loss through internal and external fraud and abuse. We found a
general lack of security consciousness among FECA district office
staff and little evidence of the implementation of recommendations
made previously in our District Office 25 study. Thirty specific
findings were _dentified and corrective actions were proposed for
each area.
- CETA Eligibility Determination and Verification Systems
Past OIG audits and investigations have very freouently identified
participant ine]ioib_iity as a major problem. In this study, we
attempted to address this problem from a systemic point of view.
The purposes of the study were:
- To review and evaluate the eligibility determination and
verification systems utilized by five selected CETA prime
sponsors;
- to identify aspects of the screening systems studied that
appear to be highly effective and may warrant
consideration for replication or adaptation by other CETA
prime sponsors; and
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- to identify aspects of the screening procedures surveyed
that appear to be ineffective and may warrant
consideration for discontinuation or modification.
Althouqb we found a number of practices that tended to
characterize the more effective prime sponsors, these practices
were not related to the screenino orocess, but more to manaqement
suoport and direction. The conclusion of this study documents the
belief of many seasoned CETA specialists that -- except for strong
and diligent proqram management -- there do not appear to he
c]early identifiable screening technioues, or combinations of
technioues, that can serve as replicable "model" elioibility
proarams for all CETA or_me sponsors.
Our study did make a number of recommendations in the areas of
training, pre-enrollment documentation, thirty-day reviews,
ouarterly eligibility verifications and Independent Monitoring
Units.
In addition to the reoorts described above, we issued the
fo]lowino draft report to ETA:
- Loss Vulnerability Assessment of Unemployment Insurance Benefit
Payment Systems and Operations
This review encompassed opermt]ons of the central office and
se]ected local offices in seven states, representative in terms of
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payment procedures, employer reporting procedures, unemployment
rate and stress rate (_ncrease of unemployment rate in Fiscal Year
1980 over Fiscal Year 197Q).
The primary objectives of the study were to analyze select UI
benefit payment systems and operations, to identify loss
vulnerabilitJes, and to recommend appropriate counter-measures to
eliminate or minimize the potential losses that could resuJt from
systemic weaknesses.
Although the Department of Labor and the states have instituted a
number of positive controls to deter fraud and abuse by claimants,
employers and UI employees, it is apparent from our review that
weaknesses still exist within the individual state programs in the
areas of computer and terminal security, payments (specifically,
pay order card processing), and check and cash control,
particularly as it relates to mailroom operations.
Additional findings were presented in the areas of employer tax,
benefit payment control units, data entry, and building security.
Althouoh the analys_s involved a limited sample of state systems,
it is believed that many of the findinos and recommendations may
be used by other states to assess their current procedures and
operations.
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Finally, agency comments were received on a report _ssued in a
prior reportingperiod.
- Migrant Farmworker Housing Conditions
In the study, we reviewed migrant farmworker housing conditions in
selected areas of Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina. We found
poor conditions in 33 of 72 migrant camps visited and fair
conditions in another 17. We also found lack of coordination
between the three DOL agencies responsible for migrant conditions
(ETA, ESA and OSHA), conflicting housing standards, and
disproportionate inspection coverage of miarant employers
utilizing the Employment Service for this ]abor supply.
We recommended that the responsibility for actual inspection of
migrant housing conditions be assigned solely to OSHA, that
unified migrant housing regulations be established, and that the
agencies involved with various aspects of the m_grant program
_mprove coordination with each other.
The agencies agreed that there was a need for better
coordination. They believed, however, that the responsibilities
traditionally assigned to the separate agencies should not be
eliminated. Actions taken to date by the affected agencies shou]d
remedy most of the problems relating to coordination end uniform
standards.
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OFFICE OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING
During the period of April 1 throuoh September 30, 1981, the
Office of Organized Crime and Racketeering ooened 42 cases. Of
these, 19 were referred to the Department of 3ust_ce, or other
authorities for possible prosecution.
There were 27 indictments involving 64 individuals during this
reporting period; 25 individuals were convicted, and the remainino
defendants are awaiting trial.
Some examples of cases follow.
• An OIG _nvestigat_on lead to a 50-count indictment in August
1981 against three officials of the Allied International
Union of Security Guards and Special Police and the
Federation of Special Police and Law Enforcement Officers,
charaino them with bribery, obstruction of justice,
embezzlement, and a state arson offense.
Daniel Cunninoham, president of the union, attempted to
obstruct OIG's _nvestioation of embezzlement by offering one
agent a $25,000 bribe and payino another aoent $2,600 to stop
the investigation. He also plotted to have his DOL
investiaative file stolen and the OIG office burned down.
His negotiations with the agents were taped by OIG. He
additionally attemped to influence the testimony of two
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government witnesses through threats and bribes and burned
down his union office to destroy union records subpoenaed by
the grand jury. (United States v. Daniel Cunningham, Herman
Jaffe F and Salvatore Ponte, Eastern District of New York)
m Following an OIG investigation, Robert A. Lins, a former
president of Teamsters Local 299, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters in Detroit, and two current officials of the
local were indicted in August 1981 on charges of embezzlement
of union funds, conspiracy to embezzle union funds, and
obstruction of a grand jury witness. The indictment
specifically charged the defendants with conspiring to
embezzle the funds of Teamsters Local 299 and converting
those funds to their own use and the use of others. Further
charges are that the defendants granted and caused to be
granted pay raises for the business agents of local 299 and
that the defendants collected and caused to be collected
funds from the business agents of local 299 from 1978 to 1980
for the purpose of financing their election campaign. (Local
299 is Michigan's largest Teamster local and is nationally
known, having been the home local of former general
presidents James R. Hoffa and Frank E. Fitzsimmons.) (United
States v. Robert A. Lins_ Raymond H. Banks t and Eugene Davis,
Eastern District of Michigan)
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• The investigation by OIG and the New York State Police lead
to charges aoainst Richard Vaccaro, business manager since
1954 of Laborers Local 333 in Syracuse, New York, of
embezzlement of union funds and mail fraud. He plead guilty
to these charoes and the plea was entered in satisfaction of
all possible charoes aoainst him relatino to embezzlement of
union funds by skimmino dues payments, double bil]ino for
travel and convention expenses, and having the union pay for
his personal expenses. The amount embezz]ed tota]ed
approximately $20,000. The investigation also uncovered
evidence that Vaccaro forced union members to work for
nothing on the construction of a $200,000 residence he built
near Syracuse. (United States v. Richard Vaccaro, Eastern
District of New York)
• In the continuing investioatJon by OIO, local law
enforcement, and the IRS into organized crime's more than one
half century of influence in the Fulton Fish Market, the
]atest results are an 167-count indictment of e_ght
individuals. Three officials of the United Seafood Workers
Local 359 and its associated employee benefit plans (one an
alleoed high-level member of an organized crime family) who
control and dominate the local and its employee benefit
plans, are included in the indictment. Charges include
receivino approximately $700,000 from businesses in the
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Fulton Fish Market throuoh extortion and prohibited employer
payments. The five businesspersons were charoed with
extortino money from firms in the market and providing the
proceeds to the union officials. (United States v. Carmine
Romano et al., Southern District of New York)
e Louis Sanzo, president of local 29, Blasters, Drillrunners
and Miners Union, was convicted on charoes of tax evasion and
conspiracy to commit tax evasion. The charges relate to his
receipt of over $200,000 from a construction company. He was
found innocent of racketeering charoes. Amadio Petito,
secretary-treasurer of the local was convicted of criminal
contempt and perjury before the grand jury. Samuel
Cavalieri, Sr., was also convicted of criminal contempt.
Thomas _ancuso, alleged high-leve] organized crime member,
was also found guilty of contempt, but died of natural causes
before sentencing. (Based on evidence presented to him, the
District Court Judge found that Cavalieri was a member of the
Luchese organized crime family under the leadership of
Antonio "Tony Ducks" Corallo and that Sanzo and Petito were
associated with organized crime figures.) The IRS entered
the case after OIG developed evidence of income tax evasion.
(United States v. Louis Sanzo, United States v. Amadio
Petito, United States v. Samuel Cavalieri I Sr., United States
v. Thomas Mancuso, Eastern District of New York)
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• William Koenio, organizer and business representative for
local 5, Internationa:_ Brotherhood of Boilermakers, and
president of the International Brotherhood of Craftsmen,
Professionals, and Allied Trades was indicted on charges of
extorting and receiving more than $30,000 from Long Island
businesspersons and with embezzling over $12,000 in medical
plan and welfare fund money. (United States v. Wllliam
Koenio, Eastern District of New York)
• Follow_no investigations by the FBI and OIG, a grand jury
returned a three-count indictment for violating the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute against Harry
Gross, a local 282 International Brotherhood of Teamsters
business agent, including charges that he obtained a
"no-show" job for his chauffeur from a construction
corporation, received two cars worth a total of $]9,000 from
two excavation companies, and extorted $2,500 from another
construction corporation. (United States v. Harry Gross,
Eastern District of New York)
• A special grand jury in September 1981 indicted John P. Duff,
international vice president of the Distillery, Wine, and
Allied Workers International Union headouartered in
Enolewood, New Jersey, and also a salaried official of three
Chicago local unions, and Howard 3. Hansen, president of
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local 3, of embezzlino over $I00,000 from local 3 _n Chicaao
and local 42 in Detroit, Michioan. Specifically, Duff is
charoed with embezzlino and convertino to his own use and the
use of others $94,064 from the two locals; and Hansen is
charoed with embezzling and convertino to his own use and the
use of others $27,192 from the two loca]s. Duff is also
charged with falsifyino records of local 3. Amounts charged
include unauthorized salary increases, unauthorized year-end
checks, unauthorized expense payments, and diversion of local
42 dues check-off money to local 3. (United States v. John
P. Duff and Howard 3. Hansen, Northern District of Illinois)
• Following a joint FBI and OIG investigation, a federal orand
jury in Tucson returned a ten-count indictment of conspiracy
to embezzle union funds, embezzlement, and mail fraud against
five officJa]s of the Laborers InternationaJ Union of North
America. The indictment dealt w_th the establishment of a
severance fund for officers and business aoents of local 479
of Tucson and local 383 of Phoenix without the authorization
or knowledoe of the memhership of either local. The
indictment charges that the defendants conspired to take
approximately $350,000 from the locals. Named in the
indictment are Mason Warren, international vice president of
Laborers and past secretary-treasurer of the Laborers
District Council of Arizona; Fred J. Brown, president of the
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Arizona AFL-CIO, former business manager of local 479 and
president of the District Council; William Soltero, Sr.,
business manager and secretary-treasurer of local 383 and
business manaoer of the District Council; Ermilio Torres,
business manaoer of local 479 and vice president of the
District Council; and Francisco Lozano, secretary-treasurer
of local 479 and deleoate to the District Council. (United
States v. Mason Warren et al-, District of Arizona)
• A federal grand jury in New Jersey returned two indictments
against Ralph O. Torraco, the principal officer of the
accounting firm of Bernard Torraco & Company, accountant for
numerous Teamster locais and benefit funds in New Jersey,
including the Trucking Employees of New Jersey Pension and
Welfare Funds and the Truckino Employees of Passaic and
Bergen Welfare and Pension Funds, which are al]eoed]y
controlled by family members of Tony Provenzano who Js now _n
prison. Provenzano, an a11eoed hioh-]eve] oroanized crime
member, is a former vice president of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), former president of IBT Joint
Councll 73, and former president of IBT Local 550.
Torraco is charged in one indictment with four counts of mali
fraud and four counts of embezzlement of benefit fund money.
He is charged with embezz]ino over $I14,000 through a scheme
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involving overbilling the funds for audit work and charoing
salarles of his associates as a fund expense. The second
indictment charges Torraco with ii counts of tax evasion and
fillno false tax returns arising from his failure to report
approximately $700,000 in income earned from numerous clients
during the period 1975-1978.
The IRS joined the OIG investigation of this matter when
evidence of tax vio]atlons was uncovered. (tlnited States v.
Ralph Torraco, District of New Jersey)
• An OIO investigation has resulted in an eJoht-count arand
jury indictment in Camden against Anthony LaMaina, business
manager, and James Conover, secretary-treasurer of local 40-B
of the International Brotherhood of Law Enforcement and
Security Officers. Whi]e full-time sworn members of the
Atlantlc City Police Department, LaMaina and Conover created
a union to oroanize security guards for casinos in Atlantic
City. They embezzled $12,000 from the union by falsifyino
union meeting minutes, which authorized them to spend money
to buy cars and provide salaries and reimbursements for
expenses for themselves. LaMa_na and Conover are Atlantic
City Do]ice officers who were alleoed]y closely associated
with the late John McCullouah, president of Roofers Union
Local 30 and alleoed Atlantic City representative for the
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late, a11eoed Philadelphia oroanized crime boss, Anoelo
Bruno. (United States v. Anthony LaMaina and 3ames Conover,
District of New Jersey)
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PART III
OIG COMPLAINT CENTER
During the period of April l through September 30, 198], 8 total
of 982 inouiries and complaints were received by the OIG complaint
center from DOL employees, the public, and referrals from the GAO
hot line. Of this total, 904 were general inauiries handled by
telephone without the center opening an official complaint file.
A total of 78 were considered to merit further action or
investigation. Of these, 43 pertained to the Employment and
Trs_ning Administration, 20 to the Employment Standards
Administration, seven to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and four to the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. Of the 78 comp]mints, 43 were forwarded for
preliminary audit or investigative review within the OIG; the
remaining 35 were referred to program agencies for review or
administrative action.
During this reporting period, final responses to 183 complaints
were received. Many of these involve matters received by the OIG
in earlier reporting periods. Of the 183, 31 complaints involved
alleaations that were substantiated by administrative review or
OIG audit or investiaatJve work. These matters are in various
stages of criminal or administrative resolution.
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PART IV
MONEY OWED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
In accordance with a reouest in the report of the Senate Committee
on Appropriations on the Supp]emental Appropriation and Rescission
BJ]] of 1980, the followJno are unaudJted estimates provided for
the aoencles by the Department of the amount of money owed, the
amount of money overdue, and the amount written-off as
uneollectihle during the six-month reporting period:
SUM_RY OF ESTIMATED
D£PARIMENI Or LABOR DEBT
Estimated Estimate_ Estimated
Out standlno Dellnouen- Adjustments and
Receivables l/ cles Write Offs
Program Sect. 30, 391_1 Sept. 30, ]981 FY 8] 3/
Nem_ (In thousands) (In thousands) (In thousands)
'EmD]oyment _tandards
Jdmlr, istrat Ion :
Federal Emvloyees
Compensation Act (F'ECA)
O overDayments to
beneficiaries/providers $ 11,600 $ ],500 $ 5,000
B]aCW Lung Pioora,_
o Responsible Mlne
Operator re Jmburse-
merit end overoPy-
ments to benefl-
clmries/provlders l_l ,JSP 131,358 2/
Employment ann
_ratn_no Ad_]n] stratJon:
o ¢Jlss]]owed cost from
audltlno or monltorlnp, 12a,OOO 6P,OOO 6B,OOO
outstendlno Cash ha]antes
after contract termina-
tion; eX'TOneOuS over-
payments to 0rantees
Mine Safety ann
Health AtlPI nJ stratJon:
o Civil Penalties
from mine operators 9,100 P,60O a,SOO
Oecupst I one] Sa fet,v
end WPa]th AdmJnistrstlon:
o civil penalties
from businesses 22,7(_0 _l,aOO 5,aOO
Pension Benefit
C'L;erant y Corpc.-at ion:
o, Termlnated plan
assets subject
to transfer and
employer lish]llty B3,740 661 7,aO_
Tots ]s $)81, a98 $2}2 ,Of 9 $'90,)0._
I/ As de'ined by O"_P BuI]etJ, NO. B]-IT, this column Inc]udes s_tual recelvsbles and amounts Ide&tJfJed er
-- contlnOent receivables which Are sub._ect to an appeals process which can eliminate or reduce the
amounts Identified. Official D0L reco.'ds conform to accepted accountlnQ principles and standards and
wi',] differ frow. these emounts.
7/ Not provided.
._/ ]nclude.¢ write offs of uncollectible receivables and adjustments of continqent receJvsble_ 8s a result
of the appeals process.
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APPENDIX
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SUMMARY OF AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED
DURING THE CURRENT REPORTING PERIOD
During the current semiannual reporting period April 1, 1981 to September 30, 1981,
we issued 251 audit reports as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training Administration
CETA Sponsors:
State and Local Prime Sponsors 133
Native American Grantees 22
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers Grantees 15
Job Corps Contractors 15
National Programs for Older Workers I
Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research Grantees 21
Technical Assistance and Training Contractors 2
Other National Programs Grantees
Subtotal 215
State Employment Security Agencies 6
Internal Audits 2
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHA Sponsors 17
Mine Safety and Health Administration
MSHA Sponsors 8
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management
OASAM Contractors 2
OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
Health and Human Services 1
Total 251
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